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INTRODUCTION
While campaigning for the Presidency in 2007, then-candidate Barack
Obama stated, "I have faith in America's courts and I have faith in our JAGs.
As president, I'll close Guantanamo, reject the Military Commissions Act, and
adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Our Constitution and our Uniform Code of
Military Justice provide a framework for dealing with the terrorists."' Almost
immediately after entering office, now-President Obama issued three Executive
2Orders intended to carry out these campaign promises.
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D.C. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and not The Judge Advocate
General's Corps, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
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Johnson for her exceptional research and editing skills, and the organizers and attendees at
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Texas School of Law, where we first discussed the ideas for this article, and the Stanford
Law and Policy Review National Defense Symposium, where we first presented the finished
product.
1. Barack Obama, Address at The Woodrow Wilson Int'l Center for Scholars (Aug. 1,
2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/13974/
obamas speech at woodrowwilson center.html, quoted in Michael D. Shear & Peter Finn,
Obama to Revamp Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, May 16, 2009, at Al.
2. According to recent reports, the Obama Administration is set to release an additional
Executive Order concerning indefinite detention in early 2011. See Dafna Linzer, White
House Drafts Executive Order for Indefinite Detention, PROPUBLICA, Dec. 21, 2010,
available at http://www.propublica.org/article/white-house-drafts-executive-order-for-
indefinite-detention. Following completion of this article, on March 7, 2011, the White
House issued an Executive Order (EO). EXECUTIVE ORDER, PERIODIC REVIEW OF
INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL STATION PURSUANT TO THE
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-
bay-nava. Timing unfortunately precludes a review of the procedures the EO describes
compared to those recommended by this article. Suffice to say, while the EO references "law
of war detention" nowhere in the standard for continued detention, or timing and conduct of
the reviews, is there a specific reference to the relevant LOAC upon which the reviews are
purportedly based. Id
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The first was Executive Order 13491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations.3
This order required that all interrogations by any federal "officer, employee, or
other agent of the United States Government'A comply with Army Field
Manual 2-22.35 and Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.6 The second
was Executive Order 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained
At the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities.' This
order created two task forces to conduct "a prompt and thorough review of the
factual and legal bases for the continued detention of all individuals currently
held at Guantanamo, and of whether their continued detention is in the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and in the interests of
justice,"8 and ordered the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo be closed
within a year.9 President Obama stated that the task forces were intended to
3. Exec. Order 13491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009) (Executive Order 13491 also
revoked Executive Order 13440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,705 (July 20, 2007)).
4. Id.
5. HEADQUARTERS, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, 2-22.3 (FM34-52), HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS (Sept. 2006) (hereinafter FM 2-22.3).
6. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention for Wounded in Field]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention for Wounded at Sea]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention for Prisoners]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention for Civilians].
The text of Common Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its
services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal
status of the Parties to the conflict.
Id.
7. Exec. Order 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009).
8. Id. § 2(g).
9. Id. § 3.
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provide him "with information in terms of how we are able to deal [with] the
disposition of some of the detainees that may be currently in Guantanamo that
we cannot transfer to other countries, who could pose a serious danger to the
United States."' 0 The third was Executive Order 13493, Review of Detention
Policy Options.' This order also established a task force, this one to provide an
overall review of the U.S. detention policies and then issue a report within 180
days. 2
In response to Executive Order 13492, the two task forces issued their
respective reports. One of the task forces, charged with reviewing the
conditions of confinement at Guantanamo,' 3 issued what is commonly referred
to as the Walsh Report.14 The other task force was charged with "select[ing]
lawful means, consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests
of the United States and the interests of justice" for the disposition of those
detainees for whom neither transfer nor prosecution was envisioned.15 This task
force recommended that "nearly 50 of the 196 detainees at the U.S. military
prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, should be held indefinitely without trial
under the laws of war."1 6 The recommendation for indefinite detention
governed "under the laws of war" is significant. Though there are numerous
proposals for eventual disposition of the Guantanamo detainees,' 7 some of
which contemplate various forms of legal detention and confinement,' none
have proposed indefinite detention under the laws of war, as recommended by
10. Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay Facility, CNN.COM (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/22/guantanamo.order/index.html.
11. Exec. Order 13493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 27, 2009).
12. Id.
13. Exec. Order 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4893 § 6.
14. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REvIEw OF DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE WITH PRESIDENT'S
EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DETAINEE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT (2009) thereinafter Walsh
Report].
15 Exec. Order 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4893 § 4.
16. Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends About 50 Guantanamo Detainees Be
Held Indefinitely, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 2010, at Al; Peter Finn & Del Quentin Wilber,
Obama Hamstrung on Guantanamo; Closure Plan Put in Doubt, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2010,
at A3.
17. Senator Graham recently proposed S. 3707, titled the Terrorist Detention Review
Reform Act which would modify the habeas corpus review process "for certain unprivileged
enemy belligerents" as well as modify the definitions applicable to detainees and the scope
of detention authority. The Bill is still in Committee. See S. 3707: Terrorist Detention
Review Reform Act, GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sll-
3707 (last visited Feb. 16. 2011).
18. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON TERRORISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, § III(B)(1) 1 124 (2002), available at
http://cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/part.d.htm; Benjamin Wittes and Jack Goldsmith, Ghailani
Verdict Makes Stronger Case for Military Detentions, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2010, at A2 1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/l1/18/AR2010l1805020.html; Jack Goldsmith, Don't Try
Terrorists, Lock Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/opinion/09goldsmith.html.
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the task force.19
The law of war, or law of armed conflict (LOAC) as it is often called and
set forth in both customary and conventional law such as the Geneva
Conventions, provides a clear framework for detention for the duration of
hostilities. 2 0 Historical practice has generally involved detention for much
shorter periods of time than many at Guantanamo have already been detained.
21 22There are some notable exceptions, however, including Israel,21 Malaysia,
Algeria23 and Morocco, 2 4 where fighters were detained for extended periods of
time, including more than twenty years in the case of Morocco.25 However, the
19. But see Linzer, supra note 2.
20. See Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6 at art. 75 stating that "the
repatriation of prisoners shall be effected as soon as possible after the conclusion of peace."
However, in that same article, the Geneva Convention for Prisoners also accommodates
longer periods of detention for some prisoners by stating "[p]risoners of war who are subject
to criminal proceedings for a crime or offence at common law may, however, be detained
until the end of the proceedings, and, if need be, until the expiration of the sentence."
21. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Lebanese Detainees Yet to Smell Freedom, THE
GUARDIAN, May 30, 2000, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/may/30/israell; Tracy Wilkinson, Activists Assail
Israel's 'Legal Hostage-Taking', L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1998, available at
http://articles.1atimes.com/1998/mar/06/news/mn-26125; Robert J. Caldwell, Israel's Harsh
Occupation Hasn't Defeated the Two-year-old Intifada, the Palestinian Revolt in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Nov. 12, 1989, at C1.
22. Alfred de Zayas, Human Rights and Indefinite Detention, 87 INT'L REV. OF THE
RED CROSS 15, 22-23 (March 2005).
23. AMNESTY INT'L CHARITY LIMITED, REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE
YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2009, 5 (2009).
24. Morocco: Prisoners of War Released, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at A6, available
at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9904EEDE103EF93AA2575
BCOA9639C8B63; Morocco: Rebel Group Frees Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, September 3,
2003, at All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/03/world/world-briefing-africa-
morocco-rebel-group-frees-prisoners.html; World Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, December 15, 2000,
at Al2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/15/world/world-
briefing.html?pagewanted=2&src=pm; Barbara Crossette, 2 Diplomats Rescue 185
Imprisoned by Sahara, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/08/world/2-diplomats-rescue-185-imprisoned-by-
sahara.html; Zayas, supra note 22.
25. There are also numerous examples of "indefinite" detentions in the domestic
practice of states. See Adam Liptak, Extended Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders is Upheld,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2010, at A3 (where the Supreme Court upheld the continued
incarceration of sex offenders until they are no longer dangerous); Griffe Witte & Karen
DeYoung, Pakistan Holding Thousands in Indefinite Detention, Officials Say, WASH. POST,
April 22, 2010, at Al (discussing Pakistan's practice of holding suspected militants in
indefinite detention rather than turning them over to the court system); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, ABDICATION OF RESPONSIBILITY: THE COMMONWEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 36
(1991) (discussing the Malaysian Internal Security Act that allows the government to arrest
individuals without warrant and hold them for up to 60 days-renewable without charge or
review); Egypt: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review: Seventh Session of the
UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, February 2010, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
MDE12/008/2009/en (discussing Egyptian legislation that allows for indefinite
44 [Vol. 22:1
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vast majority of detentions have been for much shorter durations. Surprisingly,
considering the number of armed conflicts that have involved detention, there is
no common international practice concerning long-term or indefinite detention
upon which states may rely.
For those at Guantanamo held after criminal prosecution, or for whom
prosecution won't occur, and who have unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus (or not submitted a petition at all), the question then becomes,
assuming that long-term and potentially indefinite detention of unlawful enemy
combatants (or unprivileged enemy belligerents)26 will be governed by the law
of war, what should that detention look like? This Article argues that the basic
provisions and safeguards currently extant in the LOAC are sufficient to
establish a legitimate indefinite detention paradigm. Though many of these
provisions are under-utilized or ineffective in the current detention framework,
the current structure could be adapted to provide a LOAC detention model that
accounts for a contemporary view of individual rights, protections, and
privileges. Such an adapted paradigm would be appropriate for the indefinite
detention of the up to fifty detainees designated by the U.S. government to be
held at Guantanamo, and would provide appropriate safeguards and ensure the
overall security necessary for that detention until the conflict is over or until the
detainees no longer pose a security risk.
Here, there is no intent to "put [enemy aliens] in a more protected position
than our own soldiers."27 Rather, this analysis is designed to demonstrate that
the LOAC rules on detention are sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to
provide worthwhile and meaningful individual protections the Administration
can apply to those who are detained indefinitely.
Part I of this Article reviews the history of LOAC detention and the
formulation of the current framework. Part II discusses the law that applies to
detention generally and sets the stage for the analysis in Part III of specific
LOAC provisions that are either under or ineffectively utilized in the current
detention paradigm. If properly applied, these provisions provide a model for
indefinite detention under the LOAC. Finally, we propose a revised framework
administrative detention).
26. On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed the 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act, which included a section entitled the Military Commissions Act of 2009.
The new law replaces the Bush administration military commissions legislation known as the
Military Commissions Act of 2006.The Act defines the term unprivileged enemy belligerent
as:
an individual (other than a privileged belligerent) who (A) has engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners; or (C) was a part of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this
chapter.
National Detainee Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (Westlaw
2011).
27. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950).
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for LOAC-based indefinite detention that accounts for a contemporary view of
individual rights and protections.
I. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DETENTION PARADIGM
The power to detain has always been considered incident to the conduct of
military hostilities.28 This principle was confirmed in modem practice in the
Hamdi case before the United States Supreme Court.29 This section will first
provide a brief historical perspective on detention and then analyze the current
LOAC detention paradigm.
A. History
From the earliest records of armed conflict, captives have been at the
mercy of their conqueror. Though there are examples of captors who showed
mercy, 30 this was not considered a requirement by law or custom. In the
medieval world, rich knights or nobles were often detained as a means of
extracting ransom.31 With the emergence and expansion of professional armies,
detaining captives as a means of facilitating prisoner exchanges became more
common,32 but was still not recognized as a legal or customary requirement.
The Lieber Code, which was not only used in the American Civil War but also
had a great impact on European law of war practice, reflects the changing
attitude toward victims of armed conflict.33 This change is also reflected in the
first Geneva Convention of 1864 where treatment of detainees first took on a
legal obligation. 34
This legal obligation continued to be enshrined and expanded in various
instruments until it achieved full fruition in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the subsequent Additional Protocols. Many of the specific elements of the
detention regime will be analyzed below in Part II, but it will suffice to say here
28. Stephen I. Vladek, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 153, 186
(2004).
29. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
30. Sun Tzu states, "[t]reat the captives well, and care for them .. . [g]enerally in war
the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this." SUN Tzu, THE ART OF
WAR 76 (Samuel Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1963).
31. Scott R. Morris, The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for Warriors, 1997 ARMY
LAW. 4, 4 (Dec., 1997) (where the author states, "[t]he practice of not killing one's captives,
however, was rooted in fiscal reasons, not humanitarian reasons," Thomas C. Wingfield,
Chivalry in the Use ofForce, 32 U. TOL. L. REv. 111, 116-17 (2001)).
32. Gary D. Brown, Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern Utility, 156
MIL. L. REV. 200, 202 (1998).
33. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD, General Order No. 100 art. 20-25 (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code],
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/I 10?OpenDocument.
34. See Geneva Convention for Wounded in Field, supra note 6.
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that the Geneva Conventions established two different detention regimes-one
for members of the armed forces and one for civilians.35
By the simplest reading of the Geneva Conventions, members of the armed
forces were detainable at all times and could be held, with few exceptions, until
the end of hostilities. 3 Their detention was based on their status as members of
the armed forces of the opposing nation37 and was designed to prevent them
from returning to the fight. 3 In contrast, civilians could only be detained if they
presented an imperative security risk.39 Their status was to be reviewed
regularly, at least every six months, to determine if the civilian detention
needed to continue. 40
The detention regime detailed in the Geneva Conventions is widely
accepted by states and is now considered customary international law.41 This
regime was in place when al-Qaeda attacked the United States on Sept. 11,
2001. Furthermore, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions concerning
detention had been implemented by the U.S. military in Army Regulation 190-
8.42
B. Current LOAC Detention Paradigm
The start point (and possibly the end point according to the Executive
Order 13492 Task Force which considered disposition) for the current
paradigm is the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed
by Congress following the September 11th attacks.4 3 Under the AUMF the
35. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6; Geneva Convention for Civilians
supra note 6.
36. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 118.
37. Article 5 of the Geneva Convention for Prisoners mandates a process to determine,
in the case of doubt, whether a detainee is a member of the armed forces and entitled to the
privileges and protections of the Convention. It states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act
and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.
Id. at art. 5.
38. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 25-26
(2006); Thomas Bogar, Unlawful Combatant or Innocent Civilian? A Call to Change the
Current Means for Determining Status of Prisoners in the Global War on Terror, 21 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 29, 70 (2009).
39. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 78.
40. Id.
41. See generally Jean-Marie Henckaerts, IRRC Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule ofLaw in
Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REv RED CROSs 175 (2005).
42. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees, Army Regulation 190-8 (1997).
43. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat 224
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President has broad power to detain:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.
The constitutionality, and scope, of the AUMF's grant of detention
authority was first tested in 2004 in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.45 In a plurality opinion,
the Court clarified that there are some narrow circumstances in which a broad
power to detain is necessary:
[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of
detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield
is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of necessary
and appropriate force, Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized
detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.4
In response to Hamdi's argument that the AUMF did not authorize
indefinite detention, the plurality explained that "indefinite detention for the
purpose of interrogation is not authorized" but that under "longstanding law-of-
war principles" and the AUMF, the Executive Branch possessed authority to
detain "individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants" for the
duration of the conflict.4 7
The Court also stated that if the current conflict proved entirely unlike
those that informed the law of war, that the authority to detain "may unravel."48
So while the Court in Hamdi clarified the AUMF's grant of authority to detain,
it did so predicated on a determination of combatant status and U.S.
involvement in active combat, such as Hamdi's case in Afghanistan.49
Following Hamdi, the Department of Defense created Combatant Status




45. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured in
Afghanistan in late 2001, challenged his detention without charge and the manner of review
he was afforded.
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id. at 521.
48. Id
49. That predicate existed in 2004 during Hamdi, and not only has remained, but
increased since. See Ernesto Londoino, Helicopter Crash, Bombing Kill 10 NATO Troops in
Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2010, at A10, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/21/AR2010092100096.html (describing an increase in U.S. and
NATO casualties in Afghanistan each year since the Hamdi decision. By September 21,
2010, U.S. fatalities for 2010 already exceeded those of 2009, making 2010 the deadliest
year to date for the U.S. in Afghanistan.).
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The same day as Hamdi, the Court issued its ruling in Rasul v. Bush,
establishing that the federal habeas corpus statute provides U.S. federal courts
jurisdiction over challenges by foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo.50 "As
a result, federal judges could now address both the substantive scope of the
executive branch's authority to employ military detention and the nature of the
process to be employed in determining whether any particular individual falls
within the scope of that authority."51
The combination of Hamdi and Rasul prompted a Congressional response
52in the form of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The DTA
amended the federal habeas statute to exclude from its jurisdiction applications
for the writ filed on behalf of an alien detained at Guantanamo. 53 Instead of
habeas review, the DTA created jurisdiction in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia to review "the validity of any final decision of a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal that an alien is properly detained as an
enemy combatant." 54
The Supreme Court, however, thought otherwise in a case involving
Osama Bin Laden's former driver, Salim Hamdan. 5 5 Hamdan petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court prior to the DTA's enactment which
raised the issue of the DTA's applicability to already existing petitions. On its
face, the DTA is silent on the issue. The Court was not persuaded by the
Government's argument that the DTA immediately repealed federal jurisdiction
of both future habeas actions and those currently pending.
One important aspect of Hamdan is that the level, type, and amount of
judicial review required stemmed in large part from the government seeking to
50. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
51. Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney & Rabea Benhalim, The Emerging Law of
Detention: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, BROOKINGS, Jan. 22, 2010, at 9,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0122_guantanamowittes chesney.aspx.
52. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § § 100 1-1006 (2005).
53. Id. § 1005(e)(1), which provides that:
(e) Judicial Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
(e) Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, no
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider--
'(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
'(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of
the detention by the Department of Defense of an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
who--
'(A) is currently in military custody; or
'(B) has been determined by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 1005(e) of
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant.'
Id.
54. Id. § 1005(e)(2).
55. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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criminally punish Hamdan, in addition to detaining him. As the plurality
concluded the opinion:
It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today
address, the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active
hostilities in order to prevent such harm. But in undertaking to try Hamdan
and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply
with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction."
The Hamdan decision led to another Congressional response, the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA 2006)." The MCA 2006 reprised the DTA's
jurisdictional stripping provisions, only now rendering them clearly applicable
to pending habeas petitions. Two years later the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the MCA 2006 in Boumediene.59 The Court found that a
designation of enemy combatant and presence at Guantanamo did not bar
detainees from seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also held that the
MCA 2006 was not an adequate and effective substitute and thus an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.
Boumediene prompted the latest Congressional response, the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009), which amended the MCA 2006.60 The
MCA 2009's reach was very broad, from definitional changes (unprivileged
enemy belligerent instead of enemy combatant), to reworked triggers for the
definitions, modified evidentiary standards (resulting in a 281 page procedure
guide), and increased defense resources.
This merely marks the current status quo between the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches on detention. Detainee litigation continues to
work its way through the federal courts and there will undoubtedly be future
cases of import and perhaps additional legislative measures.62 Yet, the
56. Id. at 635. Following his conviction for material support of terrorism, Hamdan was
sentenced to 66 months of confinement but received credit for 61 months already served.
The United States transferred Hamdan to Yemen to serve the last month of his sentence, thus
avoiding the question of continued, law of war based detention following the criminal
sentence. See Josh White and William Branigin, Hamdan to be Sent to Yemen: Bin Laden
Driver Spent 7 Years at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/11/24/AR2008112403159.html (quoting a Department of Defense
official as saying that "[1]egally, we absolutely have a right to hold enemy combatants, but
politically is [Hamdan] the guy we want to fight all the way to the Supreme Court about? ...
no.").
57. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
58. Id. § 7(a); Arsalan M. Suleman, Military Commissions Act of 2006, 20 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 325, 330-31 (2007). The MCA 2006 also attempted to remedy the Supreme
Court's criticisms from Hamdan by providing statutory authority for military commissions
by adding a chapter to Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which covers the U.S. armed forces.
59. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
60. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
6 1. Id.
62. See Wittes, Chesney & Benhalim, supra note 51, at 9.
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considerable time, effort, and expense devoted to litigating and legislating all
things detainee has thus far largely avoided the category of detainees for whom
both transfer and prosecution have been ruled out-those to be held indefinitely
under the law of war. The litigation does provide the knowledge that the
Obama administration, and the Bush administration before it, envisions
indefinite detention for some detainees currently at Guantanamo. The litigation
also provides insight that the Supreme Court recognizes, with qualification, the
Executive Branch's authority to detain, based on the law of war, for the
duration of conflict to prevent a return to the battlefield
As the Obama administration continues its efforts to transfer and
prosecute6 detainees, the relative significance of those to be held indefinitely
will only increase. According to the Defense Department, as of September 16,
2010, there are one hundred and seventy-four detainees at Guantanamo Bay65
and of those, up to fifty, or roughly twenty-eight percent, are to be held
indefinitely.
Yet years into that detention, and despite (or perhaps because of) the
litigation, little else has been established or clarified. The first step in
developing a law of war based indefinite detention paradigm is to establish the
applicable law.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
The focus of this Article is to advocate the development of a law of war
based indefinite detention model. To analytically reach the discussion,
however, on how the law of war could, and we submit should, govern
detention, requires both explanation and qualification at the outset. This
summary addresses which aspects of the law of war would apply to an
indefinite detention system, and why.
As discussed above, a baseline predicate for this proposed framework is the
task force recommendation, and subsequent announcement by President
Obama, that a group of detainees currently at Guantanamo Bay will be
indefinitely held based on the laws of war. That answers a broader question of
which normative construct-the laws of war, or say human rights law-will
govern detention, but it does not by itself clarify which parts of the law of war
would apply, let alone how.
We submit that based on appropriate analogy, 6 6 stated U.S. policy,67 and
63. Press Release, Office of the Assistant Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee
Transfer Announced (Sept. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13884 (detailing the transfer of two
detainees from Guantanamo to Germany).
64. The first contested military commission, of Canadian Omar Khadr, began in
August, 2010, applying the Military Commissions Act of 2009.
65. Press Release, supra note 63.
66. For persuasive arguments for applying the law of international armed conflict to
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the Supreme Court decisions already discussed, applying law of war detention
rules amounts to applying the rules governing International Armed Conflicts
(IAC) to those persons detained at Guantanamo. 68 To be clear, not only does
our proposal result in IAC law applying to those detainees at Guantanamo, but
we then apply distinct areas of IAC, notably the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention for Prisoners) and
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Geneva Convention for Civilians) to individuals who as a matter of law
would otherwise not clearly qualify for the protections of one or the other
Convention. As discussed above, the Geneva Convention for Prisoners informs
on the treatment of prisoners of war while the Geneva Convention for Civilians
does so with respect to civilians. As will become apparent later, our
formulation largely entails applying detention conditions from the Geneva
Convention for Prisoners and the review procedures from the Geneva
Convention for Civilians to the same individuals, who, particularly in the case
non international armed conflict, particularly in the area of detention, see Marco Sass6li &
Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights
Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International
Armed Conflict, 90 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 599 (2008) and Ryan Goodman, The Second
Annual Solf- Warren Lecture in International and Operational Law, 201 MIL. L. REv. 237
(2009).
67. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 2311.01E, DoD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM
4.1 (2006) (stating that it is Department of Defense policy that "[m]embers of the DoD
Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts
are characterized, and in all other military operations."). The directive defines the law of war
as "encompass[ing] all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United
States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the
United States is a party, and applicable customary international law." Id. 34.1; see also
Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority Relative To
Detainees Held At Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442
(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (describing United States authority to detain as informed by the law
of war, including the Geneva Conventions and customary international law). But the U.S.
approach has also built-in flexibility. Under the Army's Field Manual 27-10, The Law of
Land Warfare, individuals "definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the
security of the State" are "not entitled to claim such rights and privileges under GC as
would, if exercised in favor of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such
State." DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE T 248 (July 1956).
68. The proposition to apply the full panoply of the LOAC, essentially applying the
law governing IAC to detention in a NIAC seems ripe for attack. From there, conflating
aspects of IAC seemingly only increases that vulnerability. One immediate criticism would
be that IAC is status based ("prisoner of war" for example) which is inapposite to NIAC. Yet
at its essence, the concern for applying the status based IAC to NIAC detention revolves
around the combatant immunity which flows from that status. Applying IAC by analogy or
policy does not confer status to which the individuals would not otherwise possess or be
entitled. See Sass6li & Olson, supra note 66, at 624. And combatant immunity is immunity
from prosecution, which is not a problem in the first place for the detainee population at
issue, those who the U.S. can neither transfer nor prosecute. Instead, application by analogy
of IAC to NIAC detention is "the closest fit or closest approximation ... for questions of
who may be detained and what types of activities on the part of civilians are subject to
detention." Goodman, supra note 66, at 241.
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of those who directly participate in hostilities or perform a continuous combat
function, may not qualify as either a prisoner of war or a civilian in the strict
69
sense.
This is not to say that there is no distinction between a civilian detained as
a security threat and a civilian who either directly participated in hostilities or
performed a continuous combat function. But the review process we envision
could account for those differences and how they impact the assessment of the
detainee as a security threat. Nor is there a question of whether reviewing
detention under the Geneva Convention for Civilians affords an unprivileged
belligerent protections, procedural or otherwise, to which they would otherwise
not be entitled. There is no review mechanism under the Geneva Convention
for Prisoners, detention is authorized for the duration of hostilities. Difficulties
in categorizing the nonstate actors engaged in the current conflicts solely under
the Geneva Convention for Prisoners or the Geneva Convention for Civilians,
the nature of the conflicts, and uncertainty as to their end suggest that rigid
application of the Geneva Conventions will not be (and has not been)
productive. Yet these difficulties, particularly in categorization, may also lend
support to the proposition that detention be informed by aspects of both of
these Conventions. 70
Those who would deconstruct the law of war as applied to detention
stemming from armed conflict with non state actors may achieve victory, but in
an academic, and, practically speaking, pyrrhic sense. Arguing that the Geneva
Conventions for Prisoners and Civilians do not, on their face, apply to members
of al-Qaeda or the Taliban may be correct, and in more than one way. But in so
69. Somewhat oddly, the Geneva Convention for Civilians, while devoted to civilians
never defines the term. Not until Additional Protocol I did a definition of civilians emerge, a
negative one, that "a civilian is any person who does not belong to" the Geneva Convention
for Prisoners. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 at
art. 50(1) [hereinafter Protocol Additional]. This suggests that essentially everyone on the
battlefield is either a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention for Prisoners, or, if not,
then they are considered a civilian under the Geneva Convention for Civilians. However, as
the International Committee of the Red Cross commentary to Additional Protocol I notes,
"things are not always so straightforward." Id. art. 45 § 1761. Elsewhere in that portion of
the commentary, the International Committee of the Red Cross discusses the circumstance
by which an individual who did not qualify as a matter of law as a prisoner of war would be
still be treated as such. See id. § 1736.
70. This approach may be useful to the United States for more than just the very near
term. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Hamdi recognized the inherent authority of
U.S. forces to detain individuals in Afghanistan while the area is still essentially an active
combat theatre. And as discussed, unfortunately Afghanistan has been all too active. But at
some point, whether through effective counter insurgency efforts or troop withdrawals, the
situation will not be so easily classified as active combat while the need for detention
continues. This could raise the spectre of the "unraveling" of the detention authority alluded
to by the Hamdi plurality. A law-of-war-based system may provide for alternative detention
arguments in that event. Specifically, the Geneva Convention for Civilians provides for the
detention of security threats.
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arguing, the deconstructionist approach removes a large portion of
internationally recognized and accepted provisions for regulating detention
associated with armed conflict-the Geneva Conventions-while leaving the
underlying question of how to govern detention unanswered. At some point,
even the deconstructionist must shift to positivism and propose an alternative,
an alternative we submit would inevitably resemble that which is already extant
in the law of war. Moreover, while there has been discussion about the strained
application of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols to states
combating transnational terrorism, attempts at a new convention have gained
little traction.
Our approach is more an attempt at pragmatism than radicalism-there are
individuals currently detained, purportedly indefinitely and under the law of
war. Yet despite years of such detention, two administrations have provided
little if any information on what exactly such detention means, how and by
what it is governed, and if and how it ends. Conflating aspects of
internationally recognized law of war conventions allows for a transparent
process that could be promulgated now. Whether for the up to fifty or so
individuals currently detained at Guantanamo or for those who may be detained
in the future, we posit that the law of war provides a legitimate model for
indefinite detention.
And, as the Walsh Report recognized,71 the longer detainees are held, the
more concern for their individual situations must be given. We therefore
analyze the complete protections provided by the law of war and advocate that
all of them, over time and to varying degrees, be applied to the detainees in
Guantanamo. In this way, detention under the laws of war can provide a
humane system of indefinite detention that strikes the right balance between the
security of the nation and the rights of individuals.
A. Detention Basis and Review
The law of war recognizes authority to detain a broad spectrum of
individuals; the more commonly known being members of the armed forces
and organized militias of a party to the conflict. 72 Lesser known, but
increasingly prevalent in today's conflicts involving non-state actors and
asymmetric warfare, are law of war provisions which govern detention of those
who directly participate in hostilities, perform a continuous combat function for
an organized armed group, or otherwise pose a security risk or threat. This
section identifies those provisions.
71. "The concept of humane treatment requires the examiner to look at various factors
in a continuum to assess whether what is humane today, is or will be humane over a longer
period of detention." Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 72.
72. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, art. 4.
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1. Entitlement to Periodic Review of Status as a Security Risk
The law of war recognizes the authority to intern individuals where the
security situation renders such internment "absolutely necessary." 73 The
decision to intern is subject to an initial review "as soon as possible by an
appropriate court or administrative board" designated by the detaining power
and at least semi-annual review thereafter. 74
Therein lies the flexibility afforded by the law of war-judicial review is
not required. However, "where the decision is an administrative one, it must be
made not by one official but by an administrative board offering the necessary
guarantees of independence and impartiality."75
While the timing of the initial review is as soon as possible, even that
seems more flexible than the self-imposed and seemingly arbitrary "96 hour
rule" by which the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan turns
over detainees to the Afghan government after their capture.
Perhaps more significant within the context of Guantanamo Bay, the
periodic reviews are automatic and are conducted "at least twice a year" and
"with a view to favourably amending the initial decision if circumstances
permit."76
2. Rights During Review
Neither the Geneva Convention for Prisoners nor the Commentary
provides detail about the conduct of the review other than the semi-annual
frequency and the presumption to favorably amend the detention. The test is
whether the review "offer[s] the necessary guarantees of independence and
impartiality" and is conducted with "absolute objectivity and impartiality."77
The question then becomes what rights do or should the detainee have
during the periodic review? We propose looking elsewhere within the Geneva
Conventions in order to identify internationally recognized rights. Admittedly,
these rights on their face apply to civilians subject to criminal prosecution.
While that is not directly applicable to the situation here, as will be discussed in
Part III, the rights are essentially the same as would be available during
administrative proceedings within the U.S. military. Yet incorporating by
policy those same rights from the Geneva Convention for Civilians both
maintains a law of war footing and limits the vulnerability of the framework to
criticism given the universal acceptance of the Geneva Conventions.
73. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 42.
74. Id. at art. 43.
75. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV
GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR
260 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Maj. Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958).
76. UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 260-62.
77. Id. at 260-61.
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Referencing the Geneva Convention for Civilians would incorporate the
following rights into, and provide transparency to the periodic review:
Accused persons shall have the right to present evidence necessary to their
defence and may, in particular, call witnesses. They shall have the right to be
assisted by a qualified advocate or counsel of their own choice, who shall be
able to visit them freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing
the defence. . . . Accused persons shall, unless they freely waive such
assistance, be aided by an interpreter, both during preliminary investigation
and during the hearing in court. They shall have at any time the right to object
to the interpreter and to ask for his replacement.78
B. Conditions of Detention
As the United States prepares for the indefinite detention of certain
detainees at Guantanamo, it is important to note that the LOAC provides ample
and adequate provisions concerning the conditions of detention.
This part of the Article describes some of the current conditions of
detention together with the provisions of the LOAC that are directly applicable
to those conditions. Each topic is divided into two subsections. The first
identifies and lists the provisions of the LOAC that apply to the specific
condition of detention. The second draws on the Army Regulation on
detention, 79 the recent Walsh Report,80 and other sources to detail the current
practice, if any, for those detained at Guantanamo.
It is worth noting that currently there is a range of permitted detainee
conditions based on a system of rewards and consequences for detainee
behavior as initially outlined in the 2003 Camp Delta Standard Operating
Procedure Manual. Although the rules governing detainee treatment have
changed significantly in the years since this manual was written, a system of
rewards and consequences to incentivize good detainee behavior is still in
effect. The Walsh Report states, "[w]ith humane treatment as the baseline, the
Joint Detention Group leadership organizes camp operations around a
compliance model, through the means of incentive-based options to encourage
compliance. The options available to the Joint Detention Group only contribute
to the quality of detention for the detainee; they cannot affect the length of
78. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 72.
79. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42.
80. Walsh Report, supra note 14. It is important to note that the standard against which
the Walsh Report compared current practices for compliance with the LOAC was Common
Article 3, not the Geneva Conventions generally. However, the report draws attention to the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions that apply to each section, and descriptions of current
practice are easily compared to the requirements of the full LOAC.
81. DEP'T OF DEF., CAMP DELTA STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES § 8-7 (2003),
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/gitmo-sop.pdf ("The Detainee Classification
System is a five level system of rewards based on the premise that a detainee's behavior
determines the privileges they are allowed. As the detainee adapts to the rules of the camp,
his conduct will earn him more privileges.").
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detention."82 There are several instances where the provisions discussed below
are used to incentivize good behavior by detainees. In those cases, the
incentives used are generally additions to the minimum provisions guaranteed
by the LOAC.
1. Physical and Mental Health Care
a. The LOAC requires that the wounded and sick be treated humanely and
cared for by the Party to the conflict in whose power they may be, without any
adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political
opinions, or any other similar criteria. All care and order of treatment will be
based only on urgency of medical needs.84 Every camp shall have an adequate
infirmary where detainees may have the attention they require, as well as
appropriate diet.ss Detainees suffering from serious disease, or whose condition
necessitates special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be
admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be
given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the near future. 86 Special
facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in particular
to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation. Detainees "may
not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for
examination"88 and should be examined at least monthly to ensure they are in
good health.89 The LOAC does not include any specific reference to mental
health care for detainees.
b. Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, currently governs detention operations
for all the military services. 90 Sections 3-4(i) and 6-6 require the military to
treat detainees in compliance with the previously stated provisions and also
contain details on how health care is to be provided.9' Similar to the LOAC,
there is no specific mention of mental health issues, except to say that those
suffering from mental health issues will be separated from other detainees.92
The regulation requires, however, that all detainees with "serious disease, or
whose condition necessitates special treatment, surgery, or hospital care" be
82. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 10.
83. Geneva Convention for Wounded in Field, supra note 6, at art. 12.
84. Id.
85. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 30; Geneva Convention for




89. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 31; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art 92.
90. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 1-1.
91. Id. §§ 3-4(i), 6-6.
92. Id. §§ 3-4(i)(2).
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admitted to a medical facility and given appropriate medical treatment. 9 3
The Walsh Report details the medical capabilities to which the detainees
have access at Guantanamo. 94 There is medical input to the meals. 95 Medical
facilities include extensive medical care units and a behavioral health unit.
Detainees have twenty-four hour access to medical care, including surgical
care, and non-Department of Defense medical organizations are allowed access
to the detainees for independent medical evaluations. Those with amputations
have been given prosthetics. Regular inspections occur. As for mental health,
the behavioral health unit provides mental health evaluations and care,
including monthly screening for certain detainees. Only eight percent of
detainees are currently demonstrating active symptoms of mental disorders.96
The Walsh Report concluded that: "Conditions are in compliance with
Common Article 3 of the Geneva conventions. No prohibited acts were found
and conditions are humane." 97 Along with encouraging the continuation of
current practices, they strongly recommended that the military "[e]xpand
detainee access to dedicated linguists to assist with medical evaluation and
treatment evening and weekend hours, to enhance detainee trust in the role of
medical providers and to improve the quality of medical care."98
2. Personal Effects
a. The LOAC mandates that "all effects and articles of personal use,"
including those "used for their clothing or feeding" shall remain with the
detainee, unless taken "for reasons of security"99 This is particularly true of
items with "personal or sentimental value," 00 which do not include money.
Any such items that are taken must be receipted to the detainee and returned
upon the end of detention.' 0 Several examples of personal items are listed in
the Conventions, but no single definition is provided. The Commentaries to the
Conventions provide a helpful list based on the Conference of Government
Experts.102
b. Army Regulation 190-8, paragraphs 2-1 and 6-3 fully comply with the
93. Id.
94. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 13-15.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id. at 51-53.
97. Id. at 53.
98. Id.
99. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 18.
100. Id; Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 97.
101. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 18; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 97.
102. JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, III
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 166 n.2 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960); see also UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 420.
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LOAC and implement the requirements on treatment of personal effects,
including initial documentation upon detention, catalogue and receipt of
personal effects, and return at the appropriate time.' 0 3
The Walsh Report does not comment on personal effects, though it does
state that detainees are able to keep personal items, such as family pictures and
mail, once they have received them.104
3. Association with Others
a. The LOAC mandates that detainees should be intemed together with
other members of the force with which they were fighting, unless they consent
otherwise. Nationality, language and customs should also be used as criteria to
determine detainee housing, 05 with nationality being the most important of
these.106 Many of the other conditions of detention, such as requirements for
"intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits ... amongst" detainees are
intended also to provide detainees with opportunities for association with each
other.107 Detainees should be free to organize committees that create a "system
of mutual assistance amongst themselves." 0 8
b. Army Regulation 190-8 incorporates the LOAC provisions on
association with others in paragraphs 3-4 and 6-7.109 The Walsh Report found
that most detainees are allowed to exercise or socialize in groups between four
and twenty-two. Some detainees spend the entire day in a "communal
environment."'"0 The Walsh Report encouraged the completion of planned
changes that will allow increased opportunities for socialization amongst a
broader population of detainees.'
4. Quarters and Living Space
a. The LOAC clearly states that detention is not a punishment. Hence,
detainees are not allowed to be housed in penitentiaries, unless it is in the
interest of the detainee. 12 Rather, they are to be detained in a manner as
favorable as the forces of the detaining power, who shall make allowance for
103. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 2-1, 6-3.
104. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 37.
105. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 22.
106. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 184.
107. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 38.
108. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 103; UHLER ET AL., supra
note 75, at 441.
109. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-4(b), (d), 6-7
(a)(1).
110. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 27-28.
111. Id. at 28.
112. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 22.
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the habits and customs of the detainee. This would apply particularly to things
such as size of the quarters, bedding and blankets, access to light and heat,
healthful conditions, and access to sanitary facilities. Where men and women
are detained in the same camp, they are to have separate dorms and facilities." 3
b. Army Regulation 190-8, section 3-2 explicitly states that internment
facilities for detainees who are prisoners of war are "governed by the Geneva
Conventions.""14 The army regulation provides significant detail as to how
compliance is to be achieved for detainees. 15
The Walsh Report details current living conditions," 6 including a listing of
various square footage measurements." 7 The living quarters are one of the key
tools to incentivize compliance. Approximately sixty percent live in individual
cells.'' 8 Detainees are never put in solitary confinement or isolation.9
However, despite NGO recommendations, there is no ability for detainees to do
their own laundry except in Camp Iguana.120
The Walsh Report finds that quarters and living space meet the
requirements of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions but recommends that
some current cells be modified to allow for more space.
5. Canteens and Money
a. Under the LOAC, canteens are to be established in order to provide
food, hygiene items, and other articles for purchase by detainees for daily
use.121 They are to operate for the detainees' benefit, and this applies
additionally to any profits they produce.122 Detainees may request particular
items to be stocked at the canteenl23 and items in canteens are to be sold to
detainees at "local market prices."l24 Thus, the canteen provides detainees with
an opportunity to acquire a specific item that may not already be supplied by
the Detaining Power, such as a particular type of soap.125 In addition to
113. Id. at art. 25; Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 85.
114. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 3-2.
115. Id. §§ 3-4e, 6-lb.
116. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 10-12, 17-19, 21, 32-33, 45.
117. Id. at 17-19.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id at 45.
120. Id at 21.
121. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 28; Geneva Conventions
for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 87 (canteens are not required where "other suitable
facilities are available"). See DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 203 for examples of
"ordinary articles in daily use." Id.
122. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 28; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 87.
123. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 87.
124. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 28.
125. UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 389.
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providing goods, one of the main purposes of the canteen is to sustain the
morale of the detainees.
The LOAC also provides for an individual monetary account to be set up
for each detainee, in which they may deposit and save money.126 This includes
money they receive from outside the campl27 as well as regular allowances
which they are to receive from the Detaining Powerl28 that should be paid into
the detainee's individual account for use as he or she desires. Detainees should
also have the ability to send money out of the camp to outside sources such as
family.129
b. Current military doctrine requires each detention facility commander to
comply with the aforementioned provisions of the Geneva Conventions by
creating personal accounts and making monthly payments into those
accounts. 130
Current practice, as evidenced by the Walsh Report, does not appear to
126. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 64; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 98 (art. 97 allows civilian internees to maintain small amounts
of pocket money).
127. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 63; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 98. The detaining power, however, may limit the amount of
money detainees can receive in the interest of safety.
128. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 60; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 98. There is some doubt as to the applicability of this
provision to detainees at Guantanamo; under article 60 of the Geneva Convention for
Prisoners, the money given to a prisoner of war by the Detaining Power is made on behalf of
the prisoner's government, and is subject to reimbursement from the prisoner's government.
The commentary makes this clear:
Unlike the 1929 text, the present Convention speaks not of "pay" but of "advances of pay."
This term was introduced by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference and it seems well justified, for
it indicates more clearly the nature of the payment to be made by the Detaining Power.
Payment is made by one person to another in respect of labor or services, and pay cannot
therefore be due by the Detaining Power to prisoners of war. At the same time it is and
remains due to them by the Power on which they depend. Of this amount due, an "advance"
is paid by the Detaining Power in order to enable prisoners to improve their lot during
captivity, but subject to reimbursement by the Power on which they depend. Reimbursement
is to be made at the close of hostilities, in accordance with the provisions of Article 67.
DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 305.
Because those detained at Guantanamo are not representatives of any government, there
would be no anticipation of repayment and therefore, no obligation to provide advances of
pay. In contrast, payments made to civilian internees under the GCC are paid by the
Detaining Power, and not on behalf of another government. In the case of civilian internees,
the commentary states:
[T]he first paragraph of Article 98 lays down that the Detaining Power is to pay them regular
allowances, which, although modest, will enable the poorest among them to purchase at least
the minimum considered necessary to sustain their morale and enable them to preserve their
personal dignity. Those who have private means will also draw the allowances, since it was
thought better not to draw attention to differences in the financial position of different
internees by treating them differently.
UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 425.
129. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 63; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 98.
130. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-3a(8), (15).
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include the establishment of individual accounts or payments to individuals. It
is unclear whether this is an oversight or based on an interpretation of the
LOAC.' ' In Camp Iguana the detainees share a $100 monthly stipend from
which they can have guards purchase requested items from the naval station
exchange.' 32
6. Food and Meal Preparation
a. The LOAC requires that daily meals "be sufficient in quantity, quality
and variety" to prevent nutritional deficiencies and maintain a good state of
health for all detainees. Habitual or customary dietary needs are to be taken into
account. The LOAC also mandates that, in so far as possible, detainees shall be
given the opportunity and means to be "associated" with the preparation of
their own meals, including access to "means by which they can prepare" food
for themselves.133 The detaining power must supply sufficient drinking water
and allow the use of tobacco.134
b. Army Regulation 190-813 follows the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions and requires meals to be prepared in accordance with the LOAC.
Paragraph 6-5b(2) requires that facilities be available for Civilian Internees to
be able to prepare their own meals from additional foodstuffs they may have
received. 36
As detailed in the Walsh Report, current practice at Guantanamo does not
provide the opportunity for personal meal preparation. In terms of meal
selection, detainees select from a menu with six options and can modify the
menu every two weeks. The hospital nutritionist reviews meal selections and
adjusts the diet as necessary.137
7. Educational Opportunities
a. The LOAC requires the Detaining Power to encourage intellectual and
educational pursuits and provide the necessary means for the detainees to
participate. Examples used in the Commentary include providing musical
instruments, theater accessories, books, language courses, religion courses, and
instruction. 139 The Commentary emphasizes that the intent of this provision is
131. See Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 28.
132. Id. at 25-26.
133. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 89.
134. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 26; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 89.
135. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-4f, 6-5b.
136. Id. § 6-5b(2).
137. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 23.
138. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 38.
139. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 237.
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to guarantee detainees have "mental and physical relaxation."l 40 The Detaining
Power should promote educational opportunities, including those from certified
outside educational institutions, subject to censorship. 141 Furthermore, subject
to security requirements, representatives of relief organizations should be able
to visit the detainees for educational purposes.142
b. Current doctrine, as described in Army Regulation 190-8, accords with
the LOAC, though it does not mandate the details contained in the
Commentary. 143 When discussing education of certain detainees, the regulation
allows not only for the equipment required for educational programs, but also
requires consideration of education in basic courses such as reading, writing,
geography, and other basic skills.144
The Walsh Report details the current educational conditions for the
detainees at Guantanamo. The detainees have access to a library with over
thirteen thousand books, nine hundred magazines, three hundred DVDs-all
covering the eighteen native languages of the detainees. They also have access
to newspapers, board games, puzzles, playing cards, and other forms of
intellectual stimulation and entertainment. The detainees have access to
beginner, intermediate, and advanced level language classes in Arabic and
Pashtu, as well as classes in the humanities and arts.145
For security purposes, soft leg restraints are used when in the classrooms,
movie rooms, and communal rooms for the safety of instructors,146 but the
Walsh report did not find that this inhibited the detainees' ability to take
advantage of the opportunities provided. There was no evidence of choice or
offerings based on detainees wishes. While the report found that the current
practice was in compliance with the LOAC, it recommended expanding
intellectual programs to provide wider detainee access.147
8. Religious Practices
a. The LOAC affords detainees great freedom in the practice of religion.
The LOAC states that detainees shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of
their religious practices, including attendance at the service of their faith, on the
condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the
military authorities.148 Detainees should have access to religious material,
140. Id. at 236.
141. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 94.
142. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 125.
143. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-3a(4); 3-5m, n; 6-5c.
144. Id. §§ 6-7c.
145. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 34.
146. Id. at 44.
147. Id at 35.
148. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 34; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at arts. 38, 58, 93; Protocol Additional, supra note 69, at art. 5.
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including books,14 9 and are permitted to correspond with religious leaders,
subject to censorship.150 Adequate premises shall be provided where religious
services may be held,'5 1 and appointment of outside religious representatives is
allowed if necessary to meet the needs of the detainees so desire.152
Representatives of religious organizations should have access to visit detainees,
subject to security requirements, 53 but radical religious correspondence may be
censored.154
b. Army Regulation 190-8 provides little detail on the exercise of
detainees' religious practices, though it does make it clear that such freedom
exists and deals specifically with the issue of obtaining clergy for detainees. 155
The Walsh Report discusses the steps taken to ensure the personal religious
practice of detainees, including individual copies of religious texts and
religious items such as prayer beads. These are personal items that are not
removed from the detainee, regardless of disciplinary status. Detainees select
prayer leaders, and all detainees are allowed to pray in groups, except a small
number in one camp where prayer is conducted individually due to security
concerns. The Walsh Report recommended that this situation change so that
these detainees could participate in group prayer as well. 156
The Walsh Report makes no reference to any outside religious
involvement. There is no evidence that detainees are receiving any religious
instruction or input from any outside sources. There is no evidence of allowed
visits from outside clergy or access to detainees from outside religious
representatives or organizations.
9. Physical Exercise and Social Interaction
a. As mentioned above, the LOAC requires the Detaining Power to
encourage intellectual and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst
detainees.157 Materials such as books, games, and other recreational equipment
should be provided by the Detaining Power but may also come from relief
agencies, family, donors, or purchases by the detainees. The Detaining Power
should provide the detainees with space and time to participate in these
activities, 58 though participation is ultimately at the discretion of the
149. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 58.
150. Id. at art. 93.
151. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 34.
152. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 93.
153. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 125.
154. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 93.
155. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-3a(4), 6-7d.
156. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 25-26.
157. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 38; Geneva Convention for




detainee.159 In addition, the LOAC provides that, subject to security
requirements, representatives of relief organizations should be able to visit the
detainees, specifically to assist in organizing social and physical events. 160
b. Army Regulation 190-8 requires that detainees be provided with
"morale, religious, intellectual, educational, social, physical and recreational
activities',161 and states that detainees will be "encouraged to take part in
intellectual, educational, and recreational activities."l62 The regulation also
requires detainees to have access to recreational facilities and may include
concerts, plays, music, movies, and other activities and provides that delegates
from the International Committee of the Red Cross may assist in selection of
recreational and welfare activities.
The Walsh Report finds that recreation periods for Guantanamo detainees
vary based on where detainees live. All detainees, however, have at least a
daily two-hour minimum period of recreation and general access to books,
televisions, DVDs and games. The vast majority of detainees have
opportunities for social interaction with fellow detainees and many live in a
communal environment.16 All but those under the strictest disciplinary controls
are allowed to make phone calls to family at least quarterly.' The Report
recommends increased social interaction, particularly for those in the strictest
discipline settings. Additionally, the Report agrees with the recommendations
of various NGOs to allow video-teleconferences and visits from family.166
10. Detainee Representatives
a. The LOAC allows for detainees to elect a personal representative, or
representative committee. The Detaining Power must ensure no undue
influence is asserted in the elections, either by itself or the detainees. Detainees
of different nationalities, language, or customs may have their own detainee
representative.167 The detainee representative must be approved by the
Detaining Power, but this approval cannot be a source of manipulation.168
The detainee representatives are to have access to the Detaining Power to
159. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 94.
160. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 125.
161. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-3a(4).
162. Id. §§ 3-4d.
163. Id. §§ 6-7e.
164. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 27-28.
165. Id. at 47.
166. Id. at 27-28.
167. The International Committee of the Red Cross recommended the use of
committees because this would allow for each nationality or "group" of detainees to be
represented on the committee. See UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 438.
168. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 79; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 102.
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forward and discuss complaints concerning conditions of detention. All
complaints from the detainees should go through the detainee representatives.
The detainee representatives also have the right to communicate directly
through mail to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
Protecting Power, subject only to censorship,' 69 and to represent the detainees
to any other organization which might assist them.' 70 The International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Protecting Power can interview detainee
representatives without witnesses or representatives of the Detaining Power
present.171
b. Army Regulation 190-8 implements the above rules,172 including a
provision granting the detainee representative access to "postal and telegraph
facilities" for use by the detainee representative in communicating with the
Detaining Power, International Committee of the Red Cross, Protecting Power,
or other aid organizations.' 73 There is no evidence that any of these LOAC
provisions have been implemented at Guantanamo. The Walsh Report is silent
on this issue.
11. Right to Petition on Conditions of Detention
a. Detainees shall have the right to present to the Detaining Power any
complaints or requests concerning the conditions of detention. Detainees may
choose to do this through the detainee representative discussed above, or
directly to the Protecting Power. Such complaints and petitions are limited to
the conditions of detention.' 74 The procedure for such complaints is determined
169. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 78. The Commentary
makes clear that the right to censorship of the Detaining Power cannot be used as a tool to
obscure complaints on the conditions of detention. On this issue, the Commentary states:
The problem is to reconcile the Detaining Power's own security requirements
with the need to ensure that the right of complaint can be effectively exercised. For
reasons of security, the Detaining Power must obviously make sure that prisoners
of war do not use it as a means of communication with the outside world. The
Conference of Government Experts therefore rejected the suggestion that the words
"without amendment" should be added to the obligation to transmit complaints.
Such an addition would have resulted in doing away with censorship, and the
Detaining Power could not agree to that. The authors of the Convention considered,
however, that matters concerning only the "conditions of captivity" could be
mentioned without restriction, and the wording adopted seemed best suited to take
into account both the interests of the prisoners of war and the Detaining Power's
own security requirements.
DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 384.
170. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 79.
171. Id
172. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-4.
173. Id. §§ 3-4c(8)(c), 6-4f.
174. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 101; UHLER ET AL., supra
note 75, at 435.
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by the Detaining Power.175 These petitions and complaints sent to the
Protecting Power are to be transmitted forthwith and without alteration (except
for security concerns), and even if recognized to be unfounded, they may not
occasion any punishment. Detainee representatives may submit periodic reports
on the conditions of confinement to the Protecting Powers.' 7 6
b. Current doctrine follows the LOAC completely and implements all the
measures contained above, including the safeguards for communications with
the Protecting Power.' 77
As with provisions on detainee representatives, there is no evidence of a
formalized complaint system or procedure at Guantanamo, and the Walsh
Report is silent on the issue.
12. Information Bureau
a. The LOAC requires each Detaining Power to establish and operate an
information bureau for receiving and transmitting information about
detainees.
Complete information should be provided to the Information Bureau on
each detainee, including full name, place and date of birth, nationality or
citizenship and other pertinent identifying information. Some information such
as health issues and place of confinement should be provided directly to the
detainee's family.179 Additionally, some information may be protected at the
detainee's request, such as when the detainee accepts parole. so
b. Army Regulation 190-8 requires the establishment of the National
Prisoner of War Information Center (NPWIC) to comply with the LOAC
requirements of the information bureau.' 8' It also establishes a branch Prisoner
of War Information Center in the theater of operationsl82 that would
175. UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 434.
176. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, art. 101.
177. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§3-5b, e; 3-16; 6-8i(3); 6-9.
178. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 122; Geneva Convention
for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 136. Concerning the establishment of the bureau, the
Commentary states:
At the Preliminary Conference of National Red Cross Societies, held at Geneva in
1946, the majority of the participants recommended that the Societies should
undertake the work defined in the present paragraph. The Conference of
Government Experts, however, did not think it advisable to make any stipulation in
this regard and preferred to leave the Governments free to select an organization to
be responsible for establishing Information Bureaux.
DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 574. See also UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 523.
179. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 122.
180. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 577.
181. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 1-7.
182. The U.S. Department of Defense defines theater of operations as:
An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the
conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations
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accomplish these same tasks in the area of conflict where the detainees were
detained and their families are likely to be located. 83
Though information concerning the detainees in Guantanamo has been
released to the public by several different U.S. government agencies and
departments, there is no evidence that the U.S. government has established a
central bureau in accordance with Army Regulation 190-8 to act as a
clearinghouse for all information concerning detainees and as a central point
for contact by families and others interested in the detainees.' 84
13. Use of the Protecting Power
a. The LOAC establishes the role of a Protecting Power which accepts the
duty "to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict with respect to
detainees." Subject to the agreement of the Parties to the conflict, a willing
state takes on the role of the Protecting Power, and the Parties to the conflict
agree to facilitate the work of the representatives or delegates of the Protecting
Power.' 85 The Protecting Power, however, need not be a state. An organization
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross may also fill the role as
Protecting Power if agreed to by the Parties to the conflict.'8 Once agreed to
by the Parties, representatives of the Protecting Power shall have freedom of
movement to visit detainees.18 7
normally will be geographically separate and focused on different missions.
Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in
depth and over extended periods of time.
JOINT EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE DIvIsIoN, J-7, JOINT STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DOD
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (2010),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doddictionary/index.html (last amended Dec. 31, 2010).
183. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 1-8.
184. Continuing problems with government record-keeping and information-sharing
concerning Guantanamo detainees have been well noted. See Karen DeYoung and Peter
Finn, Guantanamo Case Files in Disarray, WASH, POST, Jan. 25, 2009, at A5, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/01/24/AR2009012401702.html. While some information
concerning Guantanamo detainees has been made available to the public via the Department
of Defense website, including a list of detainee names and information on detainee transfers,
there does not seem to be one source where all pertinent information on individual detainees
is compiled. See detainee information on the Department of Defense website,
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/DetaineeAffairs/. The Washington Post,
International Committee of the Red Cross, and other organizations offer limited personal
details on individual Guantanamo detainees. See the Washington Post detainee list, WASH.
POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/search/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
Cf Australians in Guantanamo Bay, PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA,
http://www.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubs/online/AustraliansGuantanamoBay.htm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2010) (where Australia has published detailed information regarding the case of
David Hicks).
185. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 8.
186. Id. at art. 10.
187. Id. at art. 126.
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b. Current military doctrine recognizes the potential role of a Protecting
Power and acknowledges that "a neutral state or an international humanitarian
organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may be
designated by the U.S. government as a Protecting Power."' 88 In the event that
such designation occurs, Army Regulation 190-8 tasks the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations and Plans with providing necessary coordination with
and assistance to the Protecting Powers.'8 The regulation then provides for the
Protecting Power to fulfill its obligations under the LOAC. 190
The Walsh Report does not discuss Protecting Powers, and there is no
indication that the United States has designated any state or international
organization as a Protecting Power for the detainees at Guantanamo.
Nevertheless, the International Committee of the Red Cross has had continual
access to detainees at Guantanamo and has conducted regular private visits
with them. The Walsh Report recommends granting non-governmental and
international organizations access to the detainees, consistent with security
191
concerns.
14. Relations with the Outside World - Means of Communication
a. The LOAC grants detainees the right to communicate with their families
and maintain relations with the exterior.192 The Detaining Power may not limit
relations with the outside world as a form of punishment.' 93 The right to
communicate with the outside world is to include the opportunity for detainees
to inform their families of their location.' 94 Further, the Detaining Power
should not charge for communication to or from detainees that accrue from the
transit of its territory, including necessary communications via telephone,
telegram, etc.' 95 Such communication, both into and out of the place of
detention, may be censored,196 but the process of censorship must be as
expeditious as possible. 9 7
188. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§1-5e.
189. Id. §1-4c(5).
190. See id. §§1-8g(7), (8); 3-4c(1)(b); 3-5b, e; 3-6; 3-7i(2); 3-8d-i; 3-12; 3-14, 3-16;
5-1(a)(5); 6-4c, f; 6-9; 6-10; 6-llb(4); 6-13; 6-16.
191. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 64-65.
192. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at arts. 70-71; Geneva
Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 107.
193. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 70; DE PREUX ET AL., supra
note 102, at 347.
194. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 48.
195. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 74. The Commentary
understands this provision to also include territories under the Detaining Power's control. DE
PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 363-65.
196. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at arts. 70-71.
197. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 71.The Commentary to
article 76 states on the topic of censorship:
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Detainees have the right to receive individual and collective shipments
containing relief items, including foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies, and
articles of religious, educational and recreational nature.198 These donations
may come from any outside source, including anonymous sources. 99Any
examination of goods (not books and correspondence) required by the
Detaining Power should be done in the presence of the detainee.20 These
individual and collective relief shipments should also be free of transit charge
within the territory of the Detaining Power.20 1
Detainees also have a right to legal consultation on personal matters such
as wills and powers of attorney.202 Transmission of personal legal matters may
still be censored but should be done by a legal professional.
b. Army Regulation 190-8 allows detainees to correspond with their
families and receive relief shipments, 2 03 and contains extensive provisions on
correspondence that generally complies with the LOAC provisions above. 204
This includes the provisions on legal documents as well, though there is no
provision on legal consultation.205
The Walsh Report finds that compliant Guantanamo detainees have no
mail limits. Detainees in a discipline status are limited to one hour a day to
write mail. All mail is censored, except legal mail. Censoring takes an average
of seventeen days. 206 Many detainees are allowed phone calls with family. 207
The Report provides no information on individual or collective relief
shipments.
Some authors have considered that delays caused by censorship should not exceed
two weeks, but the drafters of the Convention gave no ruling on the matter. In the
event that the Protecting Power is unable to appoint extra censors, it must
determine whether there is need for a reduction in the volume of correspondence
sent by prisoners of war.
DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 375-76.
198. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 72; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at arts. 38, 62, 108; Protocol Additional, supra note 69, at art. 5. See
also DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102 at 355-56 (where the commentary argues for a broad
interpretation of the kinds of goods allowed to be received by detainees).
199. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 72; DE PREUX ET AL., supra
note 102, at 353.
200. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 76.
201. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 74. The Commentary
understands this provision to also include territories under the Detaining Power's control. DE
PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 363-65.
202. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 77. The Commentary
acknowledges that the Detaining Power may still desire to censor these documents but
argues that this censorship should be done by legal professionals. DE PREUX ET AL., supra
note 102, at 363-65.
203. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-3a(6).
204. Id. §§ 3-5, 6-8.
205. Id. §§ 3-5d(1); 3-5f(2).
206. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 36-37.
207. Id. at 34.
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15. Relations with the Outside World - Expanded Relief Agency Visits
a. Subject to security requirements, the LOAC provides that
representatives of relief organizations, particularly the International Committee
of the Red Cross, should be able to visit detainees.208 The Detaining Power is
required to provide facilities for meetings and to "facilitate in every possible
way" the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relief
agencies,209 including organizations committed to distribution of religious,
educational, physical, sport, and entertainment goods and services, etc. 210
b. In addition to the provisions on seeking assistance through the detainee
representatives, Army Regulation 190-8 allows for direct application for
assistance to the "Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, approved religious organizations, relief societies, and any other
organizations that can assist."211
The Walsh Report finds that the International Committee of the Red Cross
has had continual access to detainees at Guantanamo and has conducted regular
212private visits with detainees. There is no evidence that other NGOs or relief
agencies have been granted access. The Walsh Report recommends access by
non-governmental and international organizations to the detainees. Such access
would have to be subject to security issues.
16. Relations with the Outside World - Receive Visitors
a. Subject to imperative reasons of security, detainees should be permitted
to receive visitors, particularly family members.213 The Commentary relies on
historical examples to argue that monthly or bimonthly visits for one to three
days are reasonable. In exceptional circumstances, a detainee might be allowed
to make visits outside the detainment camp, such as when there is a death in the
family.214
208. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at arts. 9, 125; Geneva
Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at arts. 142, 143; Protocol Additional, supra note 69
at arts. 5, 81. The Commentary draws attention to the provision that any limitations on the
number of societies providing relief should not hinder the effective operation of relief to
detainees. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 355-56.
209. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 142; Protocol Additional,
supra note 69, at art. 81.
210. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 125.
211. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 5-la(5).
212. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 64-65. According to their website, the
International Committee of the Red Cross has been visiting Guantanamo detainees since
January 2002 and, as of October 2009, has carried out sixty-nine visits at the detention
facility. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/united-states-detention (last visited Feb. 13,
2011).
213. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at arts. 142, 143.
214. UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 475-76.
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b. Army Regulation 190-8 allows certain detainees to receive visitors and
to leave the camp under certain circumstances, all subject to reasons of security
and theater policy.215
As previously discussed, the Walsh Report documents the right of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to visit detainees at Guantanamo. 2 16
Detainee lawyers may also make visits.2 17 David Hicks, the Australian who
pled guilty and was convicted at trial in Guantanamo, was able to talk with his
family218 and eventually have a visit from them.219 However, there is no
evidence of other family members visiting detainees or of detainees being
allowed to depart Guantanamo for any reason other than release or
repatriation. 220
17. Punishment During Detention
a. The LOAC allows for punishment for acts both before and during
detention and contains detailed provisions concerning punishable offenses and
221
rights that accrue before punishment can be levied. Judicial punishments can
include all potential penalties normally adjudicated by the particular forum
before which the trial occurs, including the death penalty in limited
circumstances.222 Disciplinary punishments can include fines, revocation of
privileges, labor, and confinement.223
In both judicial and disciplinary proceedings, the LOAC requires that the
detainee be given information regarding the offences of which he is accused,
and an opportunity to provide a defense, including calling witnesses, producing
224
evidence, and the use of an interpreter. Further, "[a] record of disciplinary
punishments shall be maintained by the [commandant of the place of
215. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 6-7b.
216. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 64-65.
217. Id. at 64-65.
218. Penelope Debelle, Hicks Family Enjoys Phone Chat as US Prison Lifts Gag,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/12/16/1071336961108.html?from=storyrhs.
219. Emotional Reunion for Hicks Family, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilasia-pacific/6498443.stm.
220. See earlier reports by international organizations asserting that detainees were
denied visits from family members, AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.anmestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAMR510512007&lang-e (last visited
Feb. 13, 2011).
221. See generally Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6 at arts. 83-108;
Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at arts. 64-76, 100, 118-28.
222. Geneva Conventions for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 100; Geneva Convention
for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 75, 100, 118-28.
223. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6 at art. 89; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 119.
224. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6 at art. 123; see also Geneva
Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 96.
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internment] and shall be open to inspection." 225
b. Paragraphs 3-6 to 3-8 and paragraphs 6-10 to 6-12 of Army Regulation
190-8 catalogue the current military doctrine concerning punishment during
detention. The provisions are in compliance with the LOAC, many being direct
226
quotes from the Geneva Conventions.
The Walsh Report does not discuss judicial punishment but does outline
the disciplinary paradigm at Guantanamo. The detention facility accepts as its
standard the requirement of humane treatment in disciplinary punishment found
in article 100 of the Geneva Convention for Civilians. Camp rules are read to
every detainee in his native language upon arrival and also posted in public
areas in Arabic and English. Further, disciplinary measures are based on a
published matrix, ensuring standardized, non-discriminatory punishments.
Acceptable punishments include reduced recreation periods, increased time in
the detainee's cell, and reductions in extra comfort items and privileges
(minimum privileges and comfort items are never decreased).227
C. Transfer, Parole and Termination
The LOAC allows three distinct ways in which detention can come to an
end: transfer to some other state, parole or some other form of release under
conditions, and termination or release. Each will be considered below from a
historical perspective and also from the perspective of current doctrine.
1. Transfer - Release to the Custody of Another Power
a. Under the LOAC, detainees may be transferred to another Power, so
long as that Power is also Party to the Geneva Conventions.228 The Power to
which the detainees are transferred incurs the obligations of proper treatment.
However the initial Detaining Power still must monitor to ensure the detainees
are being treated in compliance with applicable law. 229
b. Army Regulation 190-8 outlines current military doctrine on transfers of
detainees. The regulation includes detailed requirements concerning the method
225. Id.
226. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-6 - 3-8, 6-10 - 6-12.
227. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 30-3 1.
228. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 45. In terms of the debate
over closing Guantanamo Bay, under the Geneva Convention for Civilians security internees
"shall not in any case be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries,
convict prisons, etc.) to undergo disciplinary punishment therein." Id. at art. 124; Geneva
Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6 at art. 97.
229. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 12; DE PREUX ET AL., supra
note 102, at 136-37 (makes it clear that the intention of the parties was to place "full and
complete responsibility" on the Receiving Power when a transfer is made. It also makes
clear, however, that "it was never the intention of the authors of the Convention thereby to
relieve the transferring Power of all responsibility with regard to the prisoners transferred.").
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of transfer, even the minimum amount of weight each detainee is allowed, and
reinforces that transfers can only happen between Parties to the Geneva
Conventions. 2 30 The regulation is silent on any continuing responsibility for the
detainee after the transfer.
The Walsh Report describes current practice for the detainees at
Guantanamo. Prior to any transfer or repatriation, detainees are questioned by
both the Joint Task Force Staff Judge Advocate and separately by the
International Committee of the Red Cross to ensure there are no reasons to
prevent the repatriation or transfer, such as fear of poor treatment. If the
detainee has an attorney, he can also discuss the matter with his attorney.
Additionally, detainees are screened by medical professionals who also provide
input on the transfer decision. In the event that the transfer does occur, the
medical professionals also provide the detainee with at least ninety days of
existing medications and a complete medical summary which are given to the
flight crew for delivery to the Receiving Power.2 3 1
2. Transfer - Medically or Mentally Impaired
a. Those who are incurably injured or those who will not recover within
one year should be repatriated or transferred to a neutral third country.
Additionally, those who have recovered from injury or illness but whose
physical or mental fitness has been "gravely or permanently diminished"
232
should also be repatriated or transferred. This option is reserved for those
233
who are seriously wounded or seriously sick.
b. Current military doctrine creates a Mixed Medical Commission that
evaluates detainees who may be eligible for repatriation under this provision of
the LOAC. Decisions of the Mixed Medical Commission cannot be amended or
altered to the detriment of the detainee. Mixed Medical Commission decisions
are to be carried out within three months of the decision being given.234
The Walsh Report does not discuss transfers for solely medical or mental
issues. As stated above, every detainee is given a complete medical screening
prior to transfer, including at least ninety days of required medications. The
screening and medications travel with the detainee and are given to the
Receiving Power government.235
230. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§ 3-11, 6-15.
231. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at p. 70.
232. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 110.
233. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 136-37.
234. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 3-12.
235. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 70.
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3. Parole or Release on Conditions
a. Parole is the "promise[] given the captor by a prisoner of war to fulfill
stated conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of
special privileges, such as release from captivity or lessened restraint."236
Parole has a long history in the LOAC, beginning at least as early as the Punic
Wars.2 37 In these early instances, parole was mostly a vehicle for ransom or
prisoner exchanges. Medieval knights were bound by the rules of parole as long
23
as they were being properly treated.238 Medieval parole breakers "offend[ed]
God and Man."239 Instances of parole continued throughout the American War
of Independence, the Napoleanic Wars, the War of 1812, the early stages of the
American Civil War, the Boer Wars, and World War 1.240
This early practice was supported by international law. Early scholars such
as Grotious, Vattel, and Pufendorf endorsed the idea of parole. 241 The Lieber
Code, which was not only used in the American Civil War, but also had a great
242impact on European law of war practice, allowed parole and set out detailed
rules for its use. The 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1899/1907 Hague
Convention also allow parole. Finally, the Geneva Convention for Prisoners
also authorizes parole in article 21. The article states:
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in
so far as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such
measures shall be taken particularly in cases where this may contribute to the
improvement of their state of health. No prisoner of war shall be compelled to
accept liberty on parole or promise. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each
Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party of the laws and regulations
allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have given their promise in
conformity with the laws and regulations so notified, are bound on their
personal honor to scrupulously fulfill, both towards the Power on which they
depend and towards the Power which has captured them, the engagements of
236. Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct,
U.S. Dept. of Def., Dir. 1300.7 encl. 2, para. B(3)(a)(5) (Dec. 23, 1988). This Directive was
cancelled and replaced by a similarly named Directive that is dated December 8, 2000.The
newer Directive, however, does not contain a definition of parole. Parole is also defined as
"the agreement of persons who have been taken prisoner by an enemy that they will not
again take up arms against those who captured them, either for a limited time or during the
continuance of the war." 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 2459 (1914).
237. See generally 59 HOWARD S. LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT in NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES (1977); Brown,
supra note 32, at 200; William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-September 11
Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 Miss. L.J. 639, 720-24 (Winter, 2004).
238. Brown, supra note 32, at 203.
239. THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS 167 (1993), quoted
in Brown, supra note 32, at 203.
240. Brown, supra note 32, at 203-08.
241. Id.at208-10.
242. Lieber Code, supra note 33.
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their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they depend is
bound neither to require nor to accept from them any service incompatible
with the parole or promise given.243
b. While the U.S. has a history of granting parole to enemy prisoners of
war as late as World War 11,244 the current Code of Conduct prohibits U.S.
service members from seeking or accepting parole. 24 5 Army Regulation 190-8
does not discuss parole as an option for current detainees, and the Walsh Report
also does not mention parole.
4. Termination of Detention
a. The LOAC requires the Detaining Power to release detainees either
upon the determination that either the detainee is no longer a security risk or at
the end of the conflict during which they were detained.246 Release should not
be delayed for a formal peace treaty or armistice.247 Detainees may petition to
be repatriated to a different country than their country of capture or country of
origin in a case where they might be the subject of unjust measures. Such
measures affect their life or liberty, especially on grounds of race, social class,
religion, or political views, and that consequently repatriation would be
contrary to the general principles of international law for the protection of the
human being. Detainees may also request repatriation to another country for
personal reasons.248
On release or repatriation, detainees shall be given all articles, monies, or
other valuables and personal effects taken from them during detention.249
b. Army Regulation 190-8 mandates the release of detainees upon the
cessation of hostilitieS250 or "as soon as the reasons for their internment are
determined . . . to no longer exist."25 1 Upon release, the Detaining Power will
return all personal items that can be released to the detainee.252
As mentioned above, the Walsh Report documents current practice at
Guantanamo, including the opportunities for detainees to provide input on their
potential repatriation and to raise any fears related to repatriation or transfer.
243. Id.
244. Brown, supra note 32, at 214.
245. Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, Exec.
Order No. 10,631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6,057 (1955), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,017, 42,
Fed. Reg. 57,941 (1977) and Exec. Order No. 12,633, 53 Fed. Reg. 10,355 (1988).
246. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 118; Geneva Convention
for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 132.
247. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 118.
248. Id.
249. Id. at art. 18.; Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 97.
250. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, § 3-13.
251. Id. §§ 5-1g, 6-16.
252. Id. §§ 3-14, 6-16.
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Any such fears are considered by the U.S. government before a final decision is
made. The detainee's medical situation is also considered as part of the process.
If transferred or repatriated, all personal items are returned to the detainee. 253
IV. ADAPTING THE CURRENT PARADIGM TO CONTEMPORARY DETENTION
The previous section summarized the major provisions on detention in the
LOAC as well as the current U.S. doctrine and practice. In most areas, the
current practice and doctrine is in full compliance with the LOAC and will
require little, if any, adjustment to indefinitely detain certain individuals at
Guantanamo.
The previous section, however, also highlighted several areas where there
are gaps in current doctrine or practice. Additionally, as a practical matter,
there are provisions where changes in technology or capabilities need to be
translated into more modern applications of the law. The section below
suggests modifications to the current paradigm that responds to these concerns.
Underlying these proposals is an assumption that underlies many of the
concerns about indefinite detention without trial, and also seems to underlie the
Walsh Report and recommendations: The longer an individual is detained
without a criminal trial, the more liberal his conditions of detention ought to
become. Of course, this increasing liberality must be balanced against
legitimate security concerns, thus some of the proposals below highlight areas
where increased liberality should not cause undue security risks.
The proposals will be presented in four categories. Part A contains
proposals the Government should initiate now for all detainees that are not
specific to indefinite detention, though they will have a significant benefit to
indefinite detainees. Part B proposals are specific provisions that can be
implemented immediately upon the decision to detain indefinitely. Part C
proposals apply to the initial stages of indefinite detention and represent a menu
of options that can be implemented over time. Part D proposals detail some
options for the actual termination of detention.
A. Actions to be Taken Now
The review above has identified several areas where the U.S. government
is not in compliance with Geneva Conventions.254 These proposals include
things the U.S. government can do now to bring detention procedures in to
compliance with the LOAC that would benefit all detainees, including those
who are determined to be detained indefinitely.
253. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 70.
254. It is important to note that the Walsh Report only analyzed compliance with
Common Article 3 as its standard, not with the entire LOAC, though the Report does make
reference to various other LOAC provisions.
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1. Establishment of an Information Bureau
As was demonstrated above, the LOAC requires the establishment of an
information bureau to act as a central clearing house for detainee information.
Army Regulation 190-8 concurs. As has also been discussed above, however,
no such bureau currently exists. There is no single place where family members
or other interested parties can go to find out even basic information on
detainees. Much information can be gleaned through visits to numerous varied
web sites that each have a piece of information, but there is no equivalent of the
LOAC mandated information bureau. The U.S. government should form a
bureau and consolidate all detainee information. This would have to be
supported by policies, guidelines and programs for information sharing
amongst government agencies that would facilitate this process. The bureau
could then make general information, such as that required by the LOAC,
available to the public, unless such information would be detrimental to the
detainee or would create a security risk.
2. Revitalization of the Protecting Power.
The LOAC mandates the selection of a state or organization such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross to be designated by the belligerents
as the Protecting Power.255 The Protecting Power can play a vital role for
detainees in dealing with the outside world, as well as responding to complaints
and facilitating requests.256 Just as seeking the services of a Protecting Power is
mandatory for belligerent states, taking on the role of the Protecting Power is
257
also obligatory for any Party to the Geneva Conventions, if asked. Having a
Protecting Power in place would provide another layer of consideration for the
detainees, which would benefit all detainees, and particularly those who are to
be indefinitely detained. It would also provide a neutral third party that can
255. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 8. The commentary states
the requirement to have a Protecting Power is not optional, but obligatory:
This is a command. The English text, which is authentic equally with the
French, makes this absolutely clear. The command is addressed in the first instance
to the Parties to the conflict. They are bound to accept the co-operation of the
Protecting Power; if necessary, they must demand it. In the course of the
discussion, there was ample evidence of the desire of those participating to
establish a stricter control procedure and to make it obligatory.
DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 98. Similar language is found in UHLER ET AL., supra
note 75, at 86-87.
256. See DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 98, n.8 (where the commentary lists more
than thirty articles that reference the Protecting Power); UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 86-
87 (where the commentary references thirty-seven articles that reference the Protecting
Power).
257. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 98 n.8 (where the commentary states "the
command is also addressed to the Protecting Power, if the latter is a party to the Convention.




speak to conditions of detention and confirm the legality and humanity of the
Detaining Power's practices.
3. Formation of Detainee Committee or Election of Detainee
Representative
As with the Protecting Power, the LOAC does not make the appointment
258
of detainee representatives optional, and there is no evidence that this
provision is currently complied with at Guantanamo. To comply with the
previously reviewed LOAC provisions, each "group" within the population of
indefinite detainees should elect representatives who may desire to form a
committee. The representatives or committee must have access to the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Protecting Power, and be able to
advocate to the Detaining Power on behalf of the detainees. While this
improvement is important for all detainees, it is vitally important for those who
will be kept indefinitely.
4. Formalization of procedure for complaints and petitions.
Initiation of personal representatives will do much to alleviate this need,
but the LOAC guarantees detainees the right to make grievances known, and
Army Regulation 190-8 requires camp commanders to inform detainees of the
process for making complaints and petitions. There is no evidence that such
processes are in place in Guantanamo and this would be especially important
for indefinite detainees. The formalization of complaint/petition procedures
through clear instructions to detainees should be required at Guantanamo.
B. Upon Determination of Indefinite Detention
Through whatever procedure used, at some point, the U.S. government
will, and arguably has already, determine that a detainee is going to be detained
indefinitely. Once that decision has been made, certain actions should
immediately occur.
1. Notification
After the U.S. government has decided to detain a detainee indefinitely, the
detainee should be immediately notified of the decision and any rights to appeal
or contest the decision. The International Committee of the Red Cross and
Protecting Power (if one exists) should be immediately notified of the decision
and provided with the detainee's identity and an opportunity to talk with the
detainee. The detainee should be granted the ability to personally contact
258. Id. at 389.
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family and other interested parties to inform them of the change in his situation.
2. Relocation
Indefinite detainees should be separated from the other detainees, such as
those approved for transfer/release/repatriation and those awaiting trial, and
held with other detainees designated for indefinite detention. Unless it is
specifically requested by the detainee and it is determined to be in the
detainee's best interest, indefinite detainees should not be housed and fed with
detainees who are not similarly situated. Detainees are currently separated at
Guantanamo, mostly for disciplinary or security reasons. Those who are soon
to be repatriated or returned to their home state are housed separately from
other detainees. 259 As the population of Guantanamo continues to decrease,
facilities should be made available for separate housing facilities for those who
will be indefinitely detained.
C. As Indefinite Detention Begins
Once the detainee is informed of his indefinite detention, his conditions
should be liberalized in accordance with the requirements of security. The
LOAC provides a number of options for liberalizing the conditions of detention
from those currently existing at Guantanamo. These can be carefully crafted to
ensure that they do not create security risks. These might be initiated over time
or installed immediately.
1. Quarters
As well as being separated from others who are not similarly situated, the
actual quarters allocated for indefinite detainees should be modified. Currently,
detainees have no place that they can consider a permanent residence. They can
be moved from one camp or room to another based on status or compliance.260
Once a detainee is determined to be an indefinite detainee, he should be moved
into permanent individual quarters. This does not preclude temporary relocation
for disciplinary purposes if necessary, but when his temporary relocation is
over, he should return to his assigned quarters.
The LOAC makes it clear that detainees should be quartered "under
conditions as favorable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are
billeted in the same area." 261 These quarters will become the "permanent" home
for the indefinite detainees. Separate "dorm" rooms are the standard for new
259. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 12-13.
260. Id. at 32-33.
261. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at art. 25.
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military barracks construction.2 6 2 Therefore, under the LOAC guidelines,
indefinite detainees should be provided with quarters that are similar.
These individual quarters ought to be made out of brick and mortar or other
similarly permanent materials. They should provide adequate sunlight, have
sufficient square footage including storage space, provide access to recreation
areas and to common areas, have separate or shared kitchen facilities for
263personal meal preparation, and provide laundry facilities.
2. Increased Association with Others
Detainees at Guantanamo currently have disparate levels of social
interaction, mainly for disciplinary and security reasons. Many are able to
participate in social games, gatherings, religious activities, sports, etc.264
Discipline concerns with association may still remain after the initiation of
indefinite detention, but security concerns should dwindle significantly. If these
detainees are going to be at Guantanamo indefinitely (presumably until the
conflict is over or they are no longer a security risk), increased association with
others similarly situated would present a decreased risk.
3. Increased Ability to Collect Personal Effects
In conjunction with personalized quarters, indefinite detainees should be
allowed to collect personal effects and maintain them in their possession. This
ability would still have to be balanced against any potential security risks, but
could include items such as books, computers, games, pictures, clothing, and
food items. Any personal items that were taken from the detainee and are
currently being held should be returned unless they pose a security risk.
4. Visits from the Outside World
Currently, detainees only have regular visits from the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Indefinite detainees should be allowed increased
rights to visitors. This would include visits from the Protecting Power, once it
is selected, but also other relief agencies and religious
organizations/representatives. As discussed below, this should even include
262. See HOUSING POLICY, U.S. ARMY, http://www.armygl.army.mil/hr/housing/
("The DOD Housing Manual (DOD 4165.63M) is the foundation for Army Regulation (AR
420-1), Army Facilities Management, dated 2 November 2007. This regulation replaced the
previous Army Housing Management directive (AR 210-50). The other military services
also base their housing regulations on the DOD Manual."); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MANUAL: 4165.63-M, DEP'T OF DEF., Enclosure 3, L.d(4)(e.).
263. Access to personal laundry facilities was a recommendation in the Walsh Report
from the NGOs who provided input. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 21.
264. Id. at 34.
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family members. Such visits, except those with the International Committee of
the Red Cross and Protecting Power, could be subject to censorship or other
security measures if necessary.
5. Access to the Outside World
The LOAC provides for interaction with the outside world, including
telegraph and mail.265 These provisions should be technologically modernized
to include access via telephone and the Internet. There is no doubt that such
technologies could present security risks but any contact would be subject to
censorship if needed for security purposes. For example, Intemet access could
be completely monitored and limited to certain websites or services. Rather
than mail, an indefinite detainee could be allowed to have e-mail capability,
subject to the same censorship requirements.
Computer access would also provide greatly increased access for social and
educational advancement. Indefinite detainees could enroll in online courses,
vastly expanding their educational opportunities compared to those available
under the current system.
6. Contact with Family
Under certain circumstances, the LOAC provides for familial contact.
Telegrams are specifically mentioned as a resource the Detaining Power should
make available to detainees in special circumstances.266 As mentioned above,
modernizing this principle would include telephone calls and potentially
videoconferencing or other modem means of communication, such as e-mail.
Of course, all communications, including contact with family could be subject
to necessary forms of censorship. This could easily be accomplished through
time delay or other technological means. 267Some measures along these lines
have already been initiated. The International Committee of the Red Cross is
facilitating a video-telephone call (VTC) program launched in October 2009
which enables relatives of Guantanamo detainees to connect with their loved
ones.268
In cases where family members (or others) do not have e-mail access, the
U.S. government could create communication points in the countries where the
265. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6 at art. 71; Geneva Convention
for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 107.
266. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6 at art. 71; Geneva Convention for
Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 107.
267. But see current practice in Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, at 3-51
(which does not allow detainees to make phone calls).
268. See Pakistan: Helping Families Connect with Loved Ones in Guantanamo,




detainees are citizens to ease personal communications and relief shipments.
Items for detainees could be dropped off at these points and should be shipped
to the detainee at no charge. These points could also contain telephone and
Internet sites where family members (or others) could call or access the Internet
to communicate with the detainee free of charge.
The LOAC even allows for personal visits under certain circumstances
which should also be potentially possible under strict security requirements.
The International Committee of the Red Cross or a representative of the
Protecting Power may be used to monitor the visit if necessary. Security would
obviously be a major consideration, but over time even the need for censorship
or monitored visits may decrease.
7. Individual and Collective Relief Shipments
History has shown how important relief supplies are to detainees. The
drop-off points mentioned above could be used generally by interested parties
who want to provide assistance to detainees. Additionally, the U.S. could create
drop-off points in other military installations worldwide (rather than just where
the detainees' families are located) and allow shipments at no charge within
U.S. territory or territory under U.S. control. Likewise, detainees should be able
to make shipments out of Guantanamo under similar circumstances to family
and others.
8. Library and Educational Services
Detainees currently have access to a large number of books and classes,269
but there is no evidence that they have any input as to which books are
available and which classes are offered. Indefinite detainees should have input
as to the education program by suggesting courses of interest. Access to the
Internet as described above should assist in providing a wider variety of course
options. Indefinite detainees should also have access to the interlibrary loan
system so they can receive books by request, subject to reasonable censorship.
9. Religious Services
The LOAC requires detainees to have access to outside religious
representatives under certain circumstances. 270 There is no evidence that such
access is currently provided, but there also seems to be no reason why it could
not be provided. Indefinite detainees ought to be allowed correspondence with
outside religious representatives, including visits from outside religious
representatives, subject to security concerns, such as limitations on radical
269. Walsh Report, supra note 14, at 34.
270. Geneva Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at art. 58.
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religious views.
10. Entertainment
Morale is an important component of the health of detainees. This is
potentially even more true in the case of indefinite detainees. Detainees should
have access to multiple forms of entertainment of their choosing. Movies and
music should be made reasonably available upon request. Other multimedia
should be allowed and provided, though it may be censored.
11. Money
The LOAC requires the establishment of personal accounts where
detainees can put money aside for personal purposes.271 There is no evidence
that such accounts have been established for detainees at Guantanamo.272 The
U.S. government should consider doing so for indefinite detainees.
Even if the U.S. government does not provide indefinite detainees with a
personal allowance, detainees are authorized to receive money from outside
sources and can send money to outside sources. Therefore, personal accounts
are still necessary. Additionally, in the modem technological era, these
accounts ought to include a debit card for Internet and other similar
transactions. Of course, such purchases and receipt of purchased goods would
be subject to censoring and inspection upon arrival.
12. Canteens
There are currently no canteens organized for the benefit of detainees at
Guantanamo, though one camp does have access to some goods through U.S.
service members. In compliance with the LOAC, canteens should be
established where detainees can request-perhaps through the detainee
representatives-and then purchase specific items. The canteen should include
at least foodstuffs, drinks, supplies for correspondence, necessary toilet articles,
and supplies for personal effects, such as buttons. It should also include
miscellaneous items such as flashlights, batteries, string, handkerchiefs, and
other desired personal items, subject to security concerns. Such purchases
should be allowed from the detainee's personal account, and any profits should
be used to better the lives of the detainees.
271. Id., supra note 6, at art. 98.




The medical services provided to the detainees are quite extensive.273
However, as detainees remain indefinitely in detention, both physical and
mental health issues will continue. Routine mental and physical exams must
continue and the results must be monitored, particularly in connection with
potential termination of detention options discussed below. At some point, the
medical or mental condition of some detainees may outstrip the services
provided at Guantanamo, such as cancer treatment or more involved medical
care, and provisions will have to be made to provide this care. Consideration
should also be given to repatriation or parole for medical reasons in such
situations.
14. Legal Services
As with medical services, the longer an individual is detained, the more
likely he will need legal services. Personal legal issues, such as wills, powers of
attorney, family issues, and financial issues, will require legal assistance. While
almost all of these detainees will have legal representation on the issue of their
continued detention, such legal teams may be ill suited to perform other
personal legal matters. Detainees should have reasonable access to attorneys to
assist with these personal issues. They should also have the ability to meet with
a personal attorney over the phone or by videoconference.
15. Review of Detention
As outlined above, the process by which indefinite detention is reviewed
must be automatic. In order to avoid judicial review, "it must be made not by
one official but by an administrative board offering the necessary guarantees of
independence and impartiality." 274 The requirement of a board, and more so, of
independence and impartiality, may require changes in Guantanamo's
processes. But such changes could occur. The U.S. military, with military
judiciary and defense counsel, and inspectors general (IG), establishes separate
chains of command to ensure that those entities are, and are perceived to be,
independent and, in the case of the judiciary and IG, impartial.
The reviews would be held semi-annually and the detainee provided an
attorney, an interpreter, and the ability to call witnesses and to present
evidence. As previously discussed, the Geneva Convention for Civilians
provides such rights, as do both the United States military justice and
administrative separations processes.275 While under this model the reviews
273. Id. at 13-15.
274. UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 260-62.
275. See Linzer supra note 2 (detailing an expected new Executive Order which will
"offer detainees in this category a minimal review every six months and then a more lengthy
2011] 85
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
may occur more frequently than at present, the scope of the review would be
more limited-whether the individual poses a continued and imperative
security risk.276
The composition of the board would be that referenced in Army Regulation
190-8, a "board of officers."277 Critical to the viability of this board is a better
explanation by the Department of Defense of why military officers should be
considered independent or impartial and the review "absolute[ly) objective." To
accomplish this, the Department of Defense should ensure that board members
are not in the same direct chain of command as the authority which convenes
the periodic review.
Further, periodic review of indefinite detention should incorporate aspects
of the process by which the United States Army conducts administrative
separation boards. These boards consider whether an enlisted member of the
Army should be discharged.278 When the administrative board recommends that
the soldier be retained in service, "no separation authority will direct
discharge."279 Applied to the periodic reviews, this would mean that the
convening or appointing authority could not reverse aspects of an
administrative board decision favorable to the detainee, including release or
parole.
The standard by which the board would review the detention would be that
a majority vote in favor is needed for continued detention. The decision should
be reduced to writing.
One significant change to the current review process would be the
application of the burdens and presumptions from the Geneva Convention for
Civilians. Continued detention could result, indeed indefinitely so, but the
presumption is with "a view to favourably amending" the decision to detain and
after that the conditions of that detention.280 So the burden is on the Detaining
Power to articulate a particularized rationale for continued detention at all and
where that burden is met, for any enhanced detention conditions.
The review process must provide the detainee a meaningful opportunity to
challenge the government's case. Another concern is the standard of evidence
the board will consider. The evidentiary standard should reflect-and require-
annual review. Detainees will have access to an attorney, to some evidence against them and
the ability to challenge their continued detention.").
276. While the law of war is silent on the burden of proof, in the habeas litigation
"judges uniformly hold or assume that the government must prove eligibility for detention
by a preponderance of the evidence." WITTES ET AL., EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION,
BROOKrNGS 23 (2009) (discussing the varied approaches by the federal judiciary to the
question of whether a relationship with a terrorist organization can be vitiated). With that
frame of reference, we propose a similar threshold for the review of indefinite detention.
277. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, at 1 5-1(g).
278. See Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations, U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, Reg.
635-200 (Apr. 27, 2010).
279. Id. at 2-6d.
280. UHLER ET AL., supra note 75, at 260-62.
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both reliability and voluntariness.
One difficulty in the reviews, and one currently faced in the detainee
litigation, is to what extent changed circumstances, notably vitiating an
underlying relationship with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, should be incorporated
into the review process? This is one area where the law of war provides little
insight. Of potential use is the Geneva Convention for Prisoners provision
recognizing members of a force who "profess allegiance to an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power."281 To the extent that the law is willing to
recognize sworn allegiance, it should be willing to recognize renunciation.
Some will forecast that every detainee being indefinitely held will falsely
claim that they have "seen the light" and severed ties with al-Qaeda or the
Taliban in an effort to secure their release. While that possibility does exist, it is
not a new challenge, and rivals that faced by parole boards considering self-
described "former" gang members.
Another issue will be how the review process interprets the end of
hostilities and even where that inquiry should focus. Consider a Yemeni
captured in Afghanistan. Which conflict would the review process consider?
The specific armed conflict in which the Yemeni was captured? Conditions in
Yemen? A broader conflict against terrorism or al-Qaeda? Here, the review
should primarily consider the current status of the conflict in which the
detention occurred and the conditions in the country to which the detainee
would be released. Whether or not conflicts still exist in those areas, whether
the conflict involves the group to which the detainee was associated, and of
course whether the detainee is viewed as likely to rejoin that group could all be
considered. Continued membership (or not) in a group like al-Qaeda and the
presence (or absence) of armed conflicts between the United States and al-
Qaeda could still be considered, but at a factual or specific level. Broadly
sweeping, but generalized, assertions about a war on terror would not suffice,
or more accurately would carry little weight, in the review process.
Finally, while the presumption heading into the review is one of release,
such an outcome is required only "if circumstances permit." This provides the
Detaining Power some flexibility. The Detaining Power would also be assisted
by considering a more expansive view of, and options for, the end of detention.
D. End of Detention
Despite the determination that some current detainees in Guantanamo will
be detained indefinitely, this does not foreclose the option of release if
circumstances change. The LOAC requires release in certain circumstances and
281. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, art. 4(A)(3) 120-21. The
commentary to this provision reveals its origins were concerns over the treatment and status
of the "Free French" forces, which continued to fight Germany in World War II after France
surrendered. DE PREUX ET AL., supra note 102, at 61-63.
872011]
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
strongly suggests release in others. The following proposals should be
considered by the U.S. government as potential options over time.
1. Release, Transfer and Repatriation
As discussed above, the LOAC sets out at least three instances where
detention should end. While Army Regulation 190-8 provides for each of these
instances, there is no current statement by the U.S. government that these
provisions will apply to even those who are to be indefinitely detained. This
should be remedied. These circumstances for release, transfer, and repatriation
are uncontroversial and, if detention is truly "under the laws of war," would
undoubtedly apply to all detainees. The U.S. government should make explicit
the circumstances under which a detainee may be released, transferred, or
repatriated explicit and conduct its detention reviews with these principles in
mind.
2. Parole
As has been demonstrated earlier, parole has a long history but is
practically moribund at this point, at least for those detained by the U.S.
government. Parole has been used in non-state conflicts in the past,282 and now
is the time to reinvigorate the principle as a method of ending detention for
some of those scheduled to be indefinitely detained.
It is important to note that parole is a much broader principle than just
releasing a detainee on his honor to not return to the fight. It is about making an
agreement that includes certain assurances that allow a detainee to leave
detention with sufficient guarantees that he will remain out of the conflict, both
physically and mentally. The specifications of the parole can be whatever is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of excluding the paroled detainee from
having any involvement in the conflict.
For the indefinite detainees in Guantanamo, modem parole would certainly
include advanced technological means of monitoring the paroled detainee. Such
283
monitoring could include a combination of visual and electronic means, such
as already in use in the United States for paroled sex offenders,284 and as anti-
282. Brown, supra note 32, at 207-08.
283. A similar suggestion appears to have been made by Saudi King Abdullah who is
reported to have proposed to White House counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan,
"implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and
allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth." US Embassy Cables: Saudi King's
Advice for Barack Obama, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Nov. 28, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/1 98178.
284. See Graeme Wood, Prisons Without Walls, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Sep. 2010),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/09/prison-without-
walls/8195/l/.
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terrorism measures in Australia and the United Kingdom.285 These measures
could be combined with geographic restrictions and even close confinement.286
It might also include a guarantor, whether a government, organization or an
individual, who would guarantee that the paroled detainee would remain
compliant with the terms of the parole agreement. A guarantor system has been
used before with some effectiveness, though not specifically in conjunction
with parole.287
It is clear that some previously released Guantanamo detainees have
returned to the fight. 2 88 Historically, a parolee who violated the terms of his
285. Bronwen Jaggers, Anti-terrorism Control Orders in Australia and the United
Kingdom: a comparison, PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, available
at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2007-08/08rp28.pdf (detailing measures such as
curfew at a particular address, wearing of an electronic monitoring tag, restrictions on use of
telecommunications, and regular reporting to police).
286. Brown, supra note 32, at 203.
287. Press Release, Government of Iraq, MNF-I Launch Joint Venture to Expand
Detainee Reintegration Programs, Conduct Sp (Aug. 27, 2007), available at http://www.usf-
iraq.com/?option=com content&task-view&id=13635&Itemid=128.
288. It has been reported that the number of former Guantanamo detainees who have
returned to the fight has continued to rise. That number was twenty percent in early 2010, up
from the fourteen percent recidivism rate released the previous Spring. The first Pentagon
report released to the public in December, 2008 showed a recidivism rate of eleven percent
among former Guantanamo detainees. See, e.g., Luis Martinez, Gitmo Recidivism Rate Rises
to 20 Percent Confirmed to ABC, ABC NEWS, Jan. 6, 2010,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/01/gitmo-recidivism-rate-rises-to-20-percent-
confirned-to-abc.html.
The difficulties inherent to reporting accurately the recidivism rates in the war on terror
generally have been well noted. This is largely due to differing statistical criteria in different
locations and by groups with different interests in reporting such information. According to
Vice Admiral Robert Harward, the terminology used by the U.S. military in Afghanistan is
"recapture" as opposed to "recidivism." DOD News Briefing with Vice Adm. Harward from
Afghanistan, Nov. 30, 2010, available at http://sharing.govdelivery.com/bulletins/
GD/USDOD-10D743. This rate takes into account those who have been recaptured and
returned to the detention facility in Parwan, but does not consider those who may have
returned to the battlefield and were killed rather than recaptured. These rates are much lower
than reported recidivism rates in other locations. In a statement, Vice Admiral Hayward
stated that:
Now, I can't give you the recidivism, because maybe someone went back to the fight and
was killed and we can't capture that. So he wasn't recaptured. But it's hard because the
battlespace owners can't always clearly identify some of those combatants killed in the
battlespace, in an airstrike or that - so there's - there may be more out there that I can't
specifically prove. But I can give you the facts on those who are recaptured and returned to
the Detention Facility in Parwan. And for this year, that's been less than 1 percent.
Press Release, Dep't of Def., Vice Admiral Harward from Afghanistan (Nov. 30, 2010),
available at http://sharing.govdelivery.com/bulletins/GD/USDOD-10D743; see
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN 61 (2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/
ReportFinal SecDef 04_26_10.pdf. The report states that the current recidivism rate in
Afghanistan is 1.2 percent.
While no one would argue these statistics are acceptable, it is insightful to compare
them with domestic recidivism rates.The Bureau of Justice Statistics conducted two studies
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parole was punished with death.28 9 Any parole agreement would have to clearly
specify what the punishment for violation of parole would be, including
potential limitations on due process guarantees. At the very least, it must be
clear that the Detaining Power can revoke parole for good reason and if that
occurs, then paroled detainee must return.290
3. Rehabilitation
There is no evidence that any of the current programs at Guantanamo are
attempting to rehabilitate detainees. However, some states have initiated
rehabilitation programs for returning or released Guantanamo detainees. Saudi
Arabia's program has garnered a great deal of attention and has had success.291
The United States needs to look seriously at the potential benefits of a
rehabilitation program for the indefinitely detained, particularly in conjunction
with a system of parole.
4. Withdrawal
Another potential method for early release from indefinite detention is if
the detainee decides to withdraw from his prior membership and affiliation.
Withdrawal would be one of the factors considered in the detention review and,
292if verifiable, may provide an avenue for early release. This may be
particularly effective in conjunction with a reinvigorated parole system.
on recidivism rates in the United States in 1983 and 1994.According to the most recent study
in 1994, "released prisoners with the highest rearrest rates were robbers (70.2%), burglars
(74.0%), larcenists (74.6%), motor vehicle thieves (78.8%), those in prison for possessing or
selling stolen property (77.4%), and those in prison for possessing, using, or selling illegal
weapons (70.2%)." Furthermore, "the 272,111 offenders discharged in 1994 had
accumulated 4.1 million arrest charges before their most recent imprisonment and another
744,000 charges within 3 years of release." PATRICK A. LANGAN AND DAVID J. LEVIN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.
289. Lieber Code, supra note 33, at art. 124.
290. See Brown, supra note 32, at 203 (citing this as a widely used historical parole
practice).
291. Terence Henry, Get Out of Jihad Free, THE ATLANTIC, June 2007, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/06/get-out-of-jihad-free/5883/; Saudis
Offer Detainee Reintegration Program (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld=17097161;
Saudi Government Tries To Rehabilitate Former Guantanamo Prisoners, Jihadists (60
minutes broadcast May 3, 2009), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/30/60minutes/main4980766.shtml.
292. But see Benjamin Wittes, Peter Marguiles on S. 3707 and Future Dangerousness,
LAWFARE BLOG, (Sept. 6, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/peter-
margulies-on-s-3707-and-future-dangerousness/ (where Margulies discusses the proposed
Senate bill and its position that post-capture withdrawal is not a relevant reason for change
of status for detainees at Guantanamo).
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Verification of withdrawal would be a necessary consideration, but the
principle of withdrawal should be an option.
5. Return of Personal Effects
At the point that an indefinite detainee is to be released, transferred, or
repatriated, the presumption is that his personal effects would be returned. This
may be limited by a parole agreement but should otherwise be considered
required.
6. Death
Finally, though not technically falling under release, transfer, or
repatriation, if a detainee dies while in detention, the LOAC contains specific
provisions concerning the treatment of the body and personal effects.293 Current
294
military doctrine complies with the LOAC, though with modem
transportation methods, transferring the body to the detainees home and family
may be possible and appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In May, 2010 the White House issued the National Security Strategy,
which included the conduct of prolonged or indefinite detention. 295 Under that
strategy:
[D]etainees who cannot be prosecuted - but pose a danger to the American
people - we must have clear, defensible, and lawful standards. We must have
fair procedures and a thorough process of periodic review, so that any
prolonged detention is carefully evaluated and justified. And keeping with our
Constitutional system, it will be subject to checks and balances. The goal is an
approach that can be sustained by future Administrations, with support from
both political parties and all three branches of government.
Despite the ongoing indefinite detention of 48 individuals at Guantanamo, the
strategy remains aspirational. That need not and would not be the case if the
Administration were to match rhetoric with action and adopt a law of war based
model.
293. Geneva Convention for Prisoners, supra note 6, at arts. 120-21; Geneva
Convention for Civilians, supra note 6, at-arts. 129-31.
294. Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 42, §§3-10, 6-14.
295. The White House, National Security Strategy, (May, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/national_securitystrategy.pdf.
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